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The number of firefighters killed in the line of duty has remained relatively 
unchanged for the past three decades, despite a decrease in the number of fires occurring, 
a decrease in the number of civilians trapped in fires, and improvements in technology 
related to firefighter personal protective equipment.  The National Fallen Firefighters 
Foundation has asserted that the organizational culture that has developed among fire 
service organizations has contributed to many of these firefighter fatalities.  An 
understanding of this culture and how it can be successfully changed can be used to 
develop safer practices to reduce the number of firefighters killed each year.   
The purpose of this study is to build a comparison between two points in time for 
a fire company in the Midwest that experienced a Line of Duty Death and determine if 
and how that department’s organizational culture changed between the two periods of 
time.  Gagliardi’s conceptual framework for the creation and change of organizational 
culture is used to analyze how the department changed as a result of the death. 
A gap exists in the literature for studies that look at if and how fire departments 
change after an LODD, and sharing organizational culture changes made as a result of the 
LODD experience can be applied to other departments. 
This instrumental case study of an Illinois fire department considers the history and 
traditions of the fire department, membership practices, initial and ongoing training 
practices, the routines present in the fire station, and the community into which the fire 
department responds.  Two specific time periods were compared 2010 (when a new fire 
chief was promoted) and 2015 (4 years after the LODD) using Modes of Implementation 
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from Pasquale Gagliardi’s model for the Creation and Change of Organizational Cultures.  
This model led to the identification of 28 areas of change grouped into seven broad 
categories.  
 Firefighters and officers of the department were interviewed via semi-structured 
format to provide information about components of the organization’s culture before and 
since the Line of Duty Death.  The study revealed that the leadership change that 
occurred in 2010 was a greater driving factor for change while the LODD served as a 
catalyst and motivator for change.  The sustained changes resulted from the new leaders’ 
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There are many influences in my early life that led me into a career in public 
safety.  My father worked damage and fire control during his time in the US Navy in the 
late 1960s, and my two closest uncles were volunteer firefighters in my hometown of 
Saddle Brook.  I remember watching the television show Emergency!, watching Steve 
McQueen lead the extinguishment of The Towering Inferno, building the same Lego fire 
station over and over again, playing with a Tonka ladder truck in my backyard, and 
dressing up in plastic children’s firefighting gear.  My grade school was named for an 
educator who perished in a house fire trying to save her grandchildren.    
Boy Scouts reinforced the ethos of service to others that my family imprinted 
upon me, and led me to begin a career in the Fire and Emergency Services in 1990 with 
specific inspiration from my Scoutmaster, a Hackensack, NJ firefighter.  The first Merit 
Badge I earned in Boy Scouts came from the father of one of the firefighters who died on 
my birthday in 1988 at a structural collapse and fire at the Hackensack Ford Dealership.   
I have been both blessed to be a member of this Brotherhood and intrigued on 
how to apply concepts from adult education, organizational learning, and strategic change 
to the trade and profession of firefighting.  This dissertation represents the pinnacle of the 
union between my two greatest opportunities to serve. 
For this study, I went looking for a fire department that had suffered an LODD 
and emerged from that tragedy a better organization.  Finding such a case was a  greater 
challenge than I had expected.  As the study progressed, I uncovered a department that 
was in the process of organizational change when an LODD occurred, serving as a 
catalyst for change as much as the driving force.  I am humbled and impressed by the 
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men of the Du Quoin Fire Department, their commitment to becoming a better 
organization through deliberate change, and their leadership to learn from the death of 
Corey Shaw and prevent similar occurrences in the future.  This research project was an 
inspirational journey for me and I hope that some portion of the positive changes made 




“We understand the science of fighting fires, but we do not understand the science of 
people fighting fires” – A Montana “Hotshot” Wildland Firefighter (TriData, 1996). 
 
Chapter 1: Changing Fire Department Organizational Culture 
Since the time of Prometheus stealing fire from the gods of Mount Olympus, man 
has sought to harness fire.  In our modern context, controlling and extinguishing hostile 
fire comes at a great cost to human life.  While both the number of fires and the number 
of persons killed in fires has greatly decreased in recent decades, the number of 
firefighters that have died while engaged in firefighting duty has remained relatively 
unchanged (Clark, 2015).  The National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF) links this 
persistent trend of firefighter death to the organizational culture of the fire service (NFFF, 
2010).   
 The organizational culture of the fire service has been shown to have unique 
characteristics that are uncommon to non-uniformed professions.  Dutch social scientist 
Joseph Soeters states that the peculiarities of organizations such as the fire service 
“justify the special attention of researchers to the culture and identity of 
these…organizations” (2000, p. 466).  This fire service organizational culture is a 
contributing factor to many of the LODDs that occur each year (Temporado, 2012).  
According to Griffin, there has not been a scientific study of a fire department following 
a Line of Duty Death (LODD) before his research (2013).    Like Griffin’s research, this 
study was a case study of a fire department that experienced an LODD.  This study 
differs because it analyzes the Modes of Implementation of the organizational culture of a 
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fire department before and after an LODD, drawing a comparison between the two time 
periods. 
The work of firefighters is unique.  While other professions seek to actively 
manage risks before engaging employees in a hazardous environment, the ad hoc nature 
of responding to fires in unknown buildings means that there is often less time to 
implement elaborate safety systems or to analyze hazards present because of the urgent 
nature of civilian rescue and the evolving and growing impact of fire attacking the 
structure (Kunadharaju, Smith, & DeJoy, 2011).  Despite this dynamic environment and 
rapidly evolving set of risks, Kunadharaju’s study identified root causes that could be 
better managed to lessen the potential for death and injury by analyzing reports on 
firefighter fatalities from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH).   
This study utilized Pasquale Gagliardi’s Model for the Creation and Change of 
Organizational Cultures to analyze one fire department in southern Illinois which 
experienced the fireground LODD of a member from the collapse of a burning building.  
The Modes of Implementation (observable traits of the department) were captured for 
two time periods, one before the LODD (2010) and one after the LODD (2015).  The 
analysis determined that a change occurred, and used Gagliardi’s model helps explain the 
change.   
Background to the Study 
The position of firefighter in the United States has its roots in colonial America 
where groups of volunteers protected the community in which they lived (Granito, 2003).  
It was common for these early volunteer groups to come together for community or 
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another benefit, with entire fire departments enlisting as military units in the Civil War 
(International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA), 2010).  Until the 1960s, the 
primary evolution of the fire service was from volunteer departments to career or paid 
fire departments in response to increases in population (Granito, 2003).  Both the mission 
of the fire service, to save lives and protect property, and the level of safety and 
technology used to combat fires saw exponential growth from the 1960s to the present 
day (Granito).  The mission expanded to include Emergency Medical Services, 
Hazardous Materials, Technical Rescue, and Terrorism responses.  Technology 
expansion led to different firefighting gear configurations as well as the addition of 
thermal imaging cameras, portable radios, and computers into the fire service.  At the 
same time, the number of fires in the United States decreased, the number of career 
firefighters has increased, and the number of medical calls that firefighters respond to as 
a part of their overall responses has expanded (Stromberg, 2015).  The number of civilian 
fire deaths has also decreased.   
 Despite these new missions, improvements in technology, and reductions in the 
number of fires and number of civilian fire deaths, firefighters continue to die in the 
delivery of emergency services at an average rate of over 100 firefighters per year 
(United States Fire Administration (USFA), 2014; Pessemier, 2012).   In 2005, the 
United States Fire Administration (USFA) set a goal of reducing these fatalities by 25% 
before 2010, and by 50% before 2015 (Compton, 2008).  Chart 1 displays the information 
graphically.  The responders killed at the World Trade Center in 2001 were excluded 




Figure 1.1: Graph of Firefighter Fatalities 1990-2015 
 
   Smith and DeJoy encapsulate the problem in this way: “Firefighting is dangerous 
work, but even acknowledging this, the rates of LODD and injuries suffered by U.S. 
firefighters are considered excessive and should not be accepted as a normal part of the 
job” (2014, p. 49).  
 At the same time the USFA announced a goal of a 25% reduction in deaths, the 
NFFF identified that a change in the organizational culture of the fire service was 
necessary to cause this reduction in fatalities.  Additionally, the group indicated that a 
change in organizational culture also undergirded the other 15 initiatives they suggested 
(NFFF, 2010).  The initiatives (abridged) from the National Fallen Firefighters 
Foundation (2010) are: 
1. Define and advocate the need for cultural change 
2. Enhance accountability for health and safety 
3. Improve risk management 
4. Stop unsafe practices 
5. National standards for training, qualifications, and certification 





















































































































7. National research agenda 
8. Leverage technology for health and safety 
9. Thoroughly investigate all fatalities and injuries 
10. Implement safety through grant programs 
11. National standards for emergency response 
12. National protocols for response to violent incidents 
13. Access to counseling and psychological support 
14. Additional resources for public education 
15. Advocate for home fire sprinklers 
16. Safety as a design element for apparatus and equipment 
 
This listing makes cultural change the priority, and also acknowledges that cultural 
change undergirds the other 15 initiatives.  However the definition of culture was not 
provided, and no instruction or guidance on cultural change was provided.  This lack of 
direction and definition was an inspiration for this study. 
There is a unique organizational culture within the American fire service (Archer, 
1999; Soeters, 2000; Daniels, 2005a; Thompson & Bono, 1993; Simpson, 1996) which 
consists of patterned ways of thinking (Kluckhorn, 1951/1967; Hofstede, 2001).  Groups 
learn these ways of thinking during problem-solving, and then share solutions throughout 
the organization (Schein, 2004).  Clark connects the organizational culture of firefighting 
back to Schein by equating fire department culture to “Why we do what we do” (Clark, 
2015). This organizational culture can be changed. 
The more deeply rooted the organizational culture is, the greater the challenge of 
changing the organizational culture because a primary function of the organization’s 
culture is to maintain the culture in its current state (Gagliardi, 1986).  Change of culture 
requires a change to how the organization responds to problems and stimuli.  Since 
culture develops over an extended period of problem-solving experience as a group, this 
type of change is more difficult to make and more difficult to sustain.  Culture is 
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developed from values, leadership, the leader’s vision, successful outcomes resulting 
from the vision, and the values from the vision becoming a tacit part of the organization 
(1986).  Success reinforces these values, entrenching them in the organization’s culture.  
Each fire that the department extinguishes, each emergency response that ends 
successfully, each training that adds knowledge all strengthen the connections to the 
current way of doing things.   
Statement of the Problem 
  The number of firefighters killed in the line of duty has remained relatively 
unchanged for the past three decades, despite a decrease in the number of fires occurring, 
a decrease in the number of civilians trapped in fires, and improvements in technology 
related to firefighter personal protective equipment (Smith, 2010; Granito, 2008; 
Pessemier, 2012).  The National Fallen Firefighters Foundation has asserted that the 
organizational culture that has developed among fire-service organizations has 
contributed to many of these firefighter fatalities.  An understanding of this 
organizational culture can be used to develop safer practices to reduce the number of 
firefighters killed each year.  This study examined one such example of organizational 
change within a fire department that suffered an LODD. 
Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study was to build a description of a fire company in the 
Midwest that experienced a Line of Duty Death and to determine if the department’s 
organizational culture changed as a result of the death.  A gap exists in the literature for 
studies that look at how fire departments change as a result of an LODD, and sharing 
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organizational culture changes made as a result of the LODD experience can be applied 
to other departments (Griffin, 2013). 
Conceptual Framework 
Gagliardi (1986) created a conceptual framework for the creation and change of 
organizational cultures.  His model is well-suited for use in a study within the fire service 
because of the deeply-rooted culture that exists within a fire department.  Cultures are 
stronger and more deeply-rooted where there is stability of membership, shared history 
and experience, and a lower number of subgroups with differing sets of experiences 
(Baker-Thompson, 2006).  Stronger cultures also result when turnover is low, and 
technology is rudimentary or slow to change (Schein, 2004; Martin, 2002).   
The more scientific aspects of culture are the Modes of Implementation, 
observable aspects of the organizational culture.  The next layer is secondary strategies, 
then the organization’s primary strategy, and at the core the values and assumptions of 
the culture.  This core is more rooted in mythical knowledge than scientific knowledge, 
and it would not be uncommon for members of the culture to not be familiar with why a 
certain practice or behavior exists.   
Gagliardi proffers that there are more options for cultural change, and greater 
potential for change, with aspects of the organizational culture proportional to the 
distance from the model’s core of basic values.  His model is like an inverted pyramid, 
ranging from modes of implementation at the widest part of the pyramid, instrumental 
and expressive strategies at the second level down, primary strategy at the third level 
towards the base, and assumptions and basic values at the narrowest point of the inverted 
pyramid as seen in the below graphic.  Assumptions and basic values are the most 
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difficult to change, the primary strategy is less difficult, the instrumental and expressive 
strategies are less difficult, and the modes of implementation are the least difficult of the 
four levels.   
The model is depicted here: 
 
Figure 1.2:  Gagliardi’s Model of Cultural Creation and Change 
 
This study focused on the Modes of Implementation (MOI) on the top of the 
model.  Modes of Implementation are the observable behaviors within the organization, 
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and would have the widest range of acceptable options for change and require the least 
energy for a change, since these practices have a stronger foundation in scientific 
knowledge, and are more prone to direct observation and measurement.  Fire suppression 
tasks, the step-wise performance of the work of the fire department, would be examples 
of such Modes of Implementation. Underwriters Laboratories (UL, 2014), the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (Madrzykowski, 2014), and the 
International Society of Fire Service Instructors (ISFSI) (2014) are three national groups 
or agencies conducting extensive research into aspects of fire behavior and suppression, 
but focused on the implementation of physical science studies into the fire service.  
Application of research from these groups is aimed at impacting the top two levels of 
Gagliardi’s change model because scientifically-rooted practices can be rationally 
discussed and objectively changed more easily than the more mythically-rooted values 
and basic assumptions.  This study focused on this outermost, most-scientific level for 
comparison of two time periods. 
 The next level of the model is the organization’s instrumental and expressive 
strategies, also known as Secondary Strategies.  These are the activities between the 
actual practices/work of firefighting and the maintenance of the organization’s culture, 
which is the Primary Strategy.  An example might be a fire department which wants to 
maintain its culture of fighting fires (Primary Strategy) might verbally support fire 
prevention activities such as inspections, pre-fire planning, and fire sprinkler ordinances, 
or might verbally express an interest in training or the provision of Emergency Medical 
Services  (Modes of Implementation), but these activities are treated as a lower priority, 
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are not willingly completed, or are seen through the eyes of organization members as a 
distraction from the “real” work of fighting and suppressing fires.   
Returning to Gagliardi’s model, the third and increasingly harder aspect of 
organizational culture to change is the primary strategy.  According to Gagliardi, the 
primary strategy of an organizational culture is to resist change.  Additionally, the more 
deeply embedded the assumptions and core values (fourth and lowest level of the 
pyramid) are in the Primary Strategy, the more change-resistant the organization is likely 
to be.  This resistance is because the assumptions and basic values are the very fabric of 
what the organization is and does.  This area is most rooted in what Gagliardi classifies at 
mythical knowledge, with few if any explicit reasons for the creation of these values are 
evident (1986).  In a fire department, these assumptions and values may date back to the 
foundation of the fire department, or ideologies held by the fire service since colonial 
times (Brunacini, 2008; IFSTA, 2010). 
Gagliardi used this model to analyze how and to what extent an organizational 
culture can change, which is central to the research questions of this case study.  A 
component of his model supported by Schein is that organizations have a primary 
mission of maintaining the extant organizational culture, the distance from the specific 
organizational culture can lend a perspective that those within the culture cannot gain 
awareness of due to this almost gravitational blindness afforded by the organizational 
values.  In this way, an outsider could apply objective and scientific analysis to the 
situation surrounding an LODD better than an internal analysis team can because an 
internal team could have more difficulty separating the mythical knowledge that is 
ingrained in the organization’s culture from more objective or scientific knowledge.   
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For success in making a change to the organization’s culture, Gagliardi offers a 
concept he calls Cultural Incrementalism, where the basic values aren’t changed, but the 
fan of options to change tactics within the current values and assumptions is expanded.  
This involves selecting additional values that aren’t antagonistic to the existing ones, but 
different from them, and leveraging these expanded values to create new opportunities 
and solutions.  He suggests adding value without removing an existing one as a way to 
augment the Primary Strategy, which in turn allows for greater options for the Secondary 
(Instrumental and Expressive) Strategies, and ultimately additional acceptable options for 
the delivery of firefighting services in a manner acceptable to the organization’s culture.  
Because values are hierarchical and not independent of each other, this model allows for 
cultural change with organizational growth.  Additionally, this model allows for the 
separation of Modes of Implementation from the Secondary and Primary Strategies, 
allowing the observable behaviors of the organization to be dissected from the rationale 
behind them. 
This model is a good fit for this study because of the deeply-rooted culture of the 
fire service (Baker-Thompson, 2006; Schein, 2004; Martin, 2002).  Additionally, 
Gagliardi’s model stratifies culture from the most scientific to the most mythical, 
allowing the user to focus on changes at a specific level of the model while holding other 
aspects of the model constant or reserving them for future studies.  Lastly, Gagliardi’s 
model is built around the premise of incremental change- changing in small ways by 
modifying existing behaviors, which is more effective in strong cultures (1986). 
Research Questions 
Three research questions guided this study: 
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RQ 1: What were the Modes of Implementation of the organizational culture of the fire 
department in 2010?  
RQ 2: What were the Modes of Implementation of the organizational culture of the fire 
department in 2015?  
RQ 3: Did the organizational culture of the department change from 2010 to 2015?  
Significance of the Study 
 This case study provided insight into how one department underwent a cultural 
change between 2010 and 2015.  During that period, the department had a leadership 
change and also endured the tragedy of a member dying at a structure fire.  Through an 
analysis of the organizational culture of the fire department and the change it 
experienced, a deeper understanding of this culture and LODDs can be developed.  
Understanding this relationship within the organizational culture of the fire department 
can aid departments in their understanding of cultural change and how to be successful at 
organizational change in general.  This understanding is critical to change the culture as 
the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation desires.   While there has been a great call for 
research into firefighting organizations, “very little systematic research has been 
completed” (Smith, 2010, p. 63), and there exists only “a limited understanding of (fire 
department) organizational culture” (Pessemier, 2012).  Additionally, only one other 
scientific case study of a fire department LODD has been completed (Griffin, 2013). 
Methods/Procedures/Rationale 
A single instrumental case study (Stake, 1995) of an Illinois fire department was 
conducted.  This case study considered the history of the fire department, membership 
practices, initial and ongoing training practices, the routines present in the fire station, 
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and the community into which the fire department responds.  Firefighters and officers of 
the company were interviewed using a semi-structured format to provide information 
about components of the organization’s culture before and since the LODD.  In an 
instrumental case study, the case is of secondary interest to the study, and the study is 
driven by issues, contrasted to an intrinsic case study where the case itself drives the 
study (Stake, 2000). 
The occurrence of change was identified by a comparison between the Modes of 
Implementation in two time periods- circa 2010 (before the leadership change and 
LODD) and 2015 (4 years post-LODD).  Questions related to the LODD were limited 
and not initiated by the researcher.   
Limitations  
Qualitative studies, in general, are difficult to apply broadly to other organizations 
(Denison & Spreitzer, 1991).  The results of this case study are not meant to be 
generalized, but rather to develop a deeper, richer understanding of the organizational 
culture that is in place within the selected case.  While there may be some similarity or 
applicability to other cases, there must be scrutiny to ensure that the cases are sufficiently 
alike to extrapolate themes or categories from this case study to another. 
Assumptions 
There are several assumptions that grounded this study.  First was the assumption that 
the organizational culture of a fire department is directly linked to the flat trend seen in 
LODDs.  The second area of assumption is that the researcher’s background in 
emergency response did not bias the interviews, and a third assumption is that the 
researcher gained sufficient access to the closed fire service culture to collect meaningful 
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data.  Lastly, it was assumed that participants were as complete and honest as possible 
when participating in interviews, and portrayed as truthful a recollection as they were 
capable of contributing. 
Organization of the Remainder of the Study 
 Chapter 2 of this study first places the study in the context of the HRD literature, 
considering the concepts of culture, culture change, and strategic organizational change.  
It then reviews the relevant literature from professional journals from within the fire 
service, as well as peer-reviewed journals, governmental reports, conference proceedings, 
books, and dissertations.   
 Chapter 3 contains a description of the design and methods used for data 
collection including how the case was selected using Illinois and national databases, the 
forms of data to be collected, how data were analyzed, and issues of validity and 
reliability.  Because this case is centered on a sensitive issue, human subject protections 
were deeply considered and the plan for ensuring that interviews were as non-traumatic 
as possible is included.  The tools utilized in the data collection phase as well as 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals are listed in the appendices. 
Chapter 4 provides the setting for the case study of the fire department.  It opens 
with an overview of the community followed by a historical view of the fire department. 
Three episodes that were very influential in the development of the department’s 
organizational culture are included to provide a deeper perspective on where the 2010 
culture originated.  Lastly, the story of the fatal fire that killed Corey Shaw of the DQFD 
is presented.   
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Chapter 5 shares the study’s findings, grouped by the Modes of Implementations 
that arose from the case analysis.  This comparison demonstrates that change did occur, 
and then uses Gagliardi’s Model for the Creation and Change of Organizational Cultures 
as a framework to analyze the change.     
Chapter 6 offers conclusions, implications for the study, and areas for further 
research to expand upon this study in other milieus, locations, types of departments, and 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The purpose of this literature review is to provide background on the problem of 
firefighter fatalities and how the organizational culture of a fire department can be 
contributing to these Line of Duty Deaths (LODD).  The review consists of two sections.  
In Section 1, an overview of the fire service in the United States and the problem of 
firefighter fatalities are reviewed.  Section 2 contains information on culture in general, 
the culture within organizations, the culture within the fire service, and a model for 
changing organizational culture.  The United States Fire Administration identifies the fire 
service culture as a significant contributor to line-of-duty deaths.   
 This project was guided by the following research questions:   
RQ 1: What were the Modes of Implementation of the organizational culture of the fire 
department in 2010?  
RQ 2: What were the Modes of Implementation of the organizational culture of the fire 
department in 2015?  
RQ 3: Did the organizational culture of the department change from 2010 to 2015?  
This project was situated in the center of three bases of knowledge.  It exists 
within the literature on culture, organizational culture, and values; cultural change within 
uniformed organizations; and fire service organizational culture, firefighter fatalities, and 
the fire service’s self-initiated call for cultural change.   
The literature review was based on peer-reviewed journals, fire service trade 
magazines, conference proceedings, books, newsletters and position papers, reports from 
government agencies such as NIOSH, NIST, USFA, FEMA, and the BLS and 
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dissertations from both within and outside of the fire service.  A meta-analysis was 
conducted of other case studies not related to this topic to help structure the paper.   
This chapter is divided into two sections, the first focused on the history and 
impact of fires and firefighting in the United States, including the problem of firefighter 
fatalities.  The second section defines culture and organizational culture, provides 
examples of culture within the fire service in the United States, cultural change, and 
describes Gagliardi’s conceptual framework for cultural change.   
Section 1:  The Problem of Fires and Firefighter Fatalities 
 This section provides an overview of the history of firefighting in the United 
States, followed by an overview of firefighter fatalities that have occurred since the 
United States Fire Administration began keeping records at a national level in 1977.  
Next, the need for a cultural change to reduce the numbers of line-of-duty deaths were 
discussed. 
A Brief History of the United States Fire Service 
Fires in the early days as colonists settled the United States led to the 
establishment of fire departments as well as the creation of the nascent nation’s first fire 
prevention and building codes (Granito, 2003).  As early as 1608, a fire in the Jamestown 
settlement devastated the community.  Fires in 1623 at Plymouth Plantation, in 1653 
along the Boston waterfront, and in 1655 in New Amsterdam, as well as accounts of the 
1666 Great Fire of London demonstrated the catastrophic effects of fire to the colonists 
(Granito, 2003).   
Originally, all firefighters were volunteers, but over time, full-time fire 
departments were formed in larger metropolitan areas (Granito, 2003).  Destructive fires 
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in colonial America illustrated the risk of fire to the community and led to the formation 
of firefighting clubs to protect the property and possessions of the citizens.  These white 
male-dominated clubs were regarded by John Adams and Benjamin Franklin as 
producing colonial heroes in the early 1700s.  There was a strong social side to these 
clubs, providing both services to the entire community and recreation for members.  In 
Philadelphia, these clubs also played a role in economic activities, such as shareholding 
in private industry, and political activities, such as the recovery of runaway servants or 
apprentices.  In New York and Boston, these exclusive groups were fraternal 
organizations, guarded with watchwords to aid in identifying members who were in need 
of the club’s services.  This exclusivity led to the establishment of early public fire 
departments to care for those who were not members, or who could not be members, of 
these established clubs (Carp, 2001). 
As the number of clubs and public organizations grew, these groups shared 
lessons learned and tactics and strategies that led to successful fire control.  Equipment 
imported from Amsterdam and other European communities often came with stories that 
shared the experiences of firefighters in other cities and nations.  When the Revolutionary 
War broke out, firefighters were quick to volunteer for military service, and others were 
granted exemption from the military by serving the community as a firefighter.  As the 
British Army occupied cities like Manhattan and Boston, they were left with decimated 
fire companies, or in the case of Boston, departments that had to be put under British 
Military control to ensure a timely response (Carp, 2001)  These foundational days of 
U.S. fire departments  still resonate with firefighters today, as “the original response 
routine that Ben (Franklin) established in 1740 has defined the cultural context … and set 
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the stage for how (the fire service) has operated for the next almost 300 years” 
(Brunacini, 2008, p. 4). 
Some of the traditions exhibited in today’s fire service were carried over from the 
US Civil War soldiers who transitioned into the fire service following their military 
career.  The paramilitary nature of the fire department and the deep funerary rituals 
associated with LODDs have been traced back to these origins (Clark, 2015). 
In 2014, there were an estimated 1.13 million firefighters, with 69% being 
volunteers and 31% having the fire service as their main career (NFPA, 2016).  Granito 
shares that this is a normal shift that as cities and their suburbs grow and mature, full-
time fire crews become a necessity.   
During times of economic downturn in the United States, the position of 
firefighter was secured and envied (Granito, 2003).  These firefighters were reluctant to 
risk their financial security by seeking increased safety measures or shorter work hours.  
Additionally, officers did not prioritize the health and well-being of their firefighters over 
the inherent dangers of the job.  Until well after World War II, most fire departments 
provided only fire suppression services, with firefighters typically working 85 hours per 
week or more (Granito, 2003).   
Since the late 1960s, the job of firefighter rapidly evolved from only providing 
fire protection to responding to a broader set of emergencies.  These additional 
emergency missions include delivery of Emergency Medical Services (EMS) in the late 
1970s, beginning in Chicago, Seattle, Los Angeles, Miami, and Columbus, Ohio 
(Granito, 2003).   
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Along with the expanding duties of firefighters, the work environment became 
more hostile.  In the 1960s, firefighters and police officers became targets for riots, arson, 
and demonstrations resulting from civil unrest (Granito, 2003).  This activity of human 
threats, along with the release of the landmark study America Burning in 1973, began an 
era of significant change in fire departments across the nation (Granito, 2003).  Federal 
and labor agencies focused on increased firefighter safety as fire departments expanded 
the list of services the departments provided (Granito, 2003).  Increased understanding of 
the damage that hazardous chemicals and materials can do the environment led to the 
addition of training to mitigate chemical emergencies in the 1980s (Noll, 2003).  Eighty-
five percent of fire departments now offer some level of Emergency Medical Services as 
part of their daily operations (Janing & Sachs, 2003).  By 2002, 94% of fire departments 
offered some level of Emergency Medical Services as part of their daily operations 
(Michos, 2003).   
This broadening of missions transformed “firemen” into “all-risk” or “all-
hazards” emergency responders (IFSTA, 2010).  However, fire-related emergencies 
continue to be the leading type of emergency that kills firefighters, accounting for 71.4%  
of fatalities (55 out of 77) in 2013 (USFA, 2014).  A challenge for fire service leaders is 
to balance the contemporary threat of terrorism and the delivery of emergency medical 
services with other missions while remaining proficient in the delivery of fire suppression 
service (Weeks, 2007; NFPA, ND).  
Modern fire departments in the United States are generally organized into one of 
three broad categories:  Career fire departments, where all firefighters are paid by a city 
or other urban center;  Volunteer fire departments, where all firefighters are not paid; and 
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Combination fire departments, which are a hybrid of some paid and some unpaid 
members (IFSTA, 2004).  The fire department considered for this study is a combination 
department, with seven full-time members and 20 paid-on-call members. 
Within a fire department, tasks at a fire or other emergency are typically assigned 
based on the functional capabilities of the fire apparatus that individuals respond on, or 
are grouped with after their arrival at a fire in their personal vehicles.  The broad 
categories of apparatus are engines, trucks, and rescue/squad companies.  Engines are 
primarily responsible for advancing hose lines to the seat of the fire and extinguishing the 
fire while truck companies force entry into the structure and perform other tasks on the 
fireground to aid the engine company to extinguish the fire.  These tasks include creating 
openings on the vertical parts of a building and the roof to allow smoke to leave the 
structure, applying ladders to enter/exit a building, and controlling a building’s electric, 
water, and gas utilities.  Rescue companies typically focus on removing civilians and 
firefighters who are trapped (IFSTA, 2004).  These roles are usually well-defined in fire 
departments with predictable manpower, and more ad hoc and fluid in departments which 
do not have a fully-paid fire department, as is the situation in the department studied in 
this case.  This fluidity of roles and tasks involved in firefighting, especially in the 
volunteer and combination departments, can create a group who is well-intentioned but 
constrained by a lack of understanding of their organizational culture (Pessemier, 2012). 
Patrons of United States fire departments view the role of the fire service 
differently than those in other nations.  Outside of the U.S., fire departments tend to be 
centralized and national agencies, whereas the fire service in the U.S.  is local, and more 
deeply connected to the population.  Annually, the United States Fire Service has more 
22 
 
Line-of-duty Deaths than any European nation and has the fourth highest firefighter 
fatality rate in the world.  The U.S. firefighter fatality rate is six times higher than any 
other industrialized nation, due in part to lower levels of regulatory control when 
compared to other U.S. industries (Pessemier, 2012). 
According to the National Fire Protection Association, in 2013 (the most recent 
year that complete data is available), there were 1,140,750 firefighters in the United 
States, with 31% serving as career firefighters and 69% serving as volunteers (NFPA, 
2015). 
The Impact of Fire in the United States 
 In 1973, the National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control published the 
landmark study America Burning.  This initial look at the fire problem in the United 
States revealed that 6,200 persons, including firefighters, died annually as a result of 
hostile fire (Burning, 1973).  Additionally, over 100,000 injuries were reported annually, 
with a dollar loss of over $10 billion (in 1973 dollars) (Burning).  The report estimated a 
nationwide rate of 300 fires per hour (p. 18), which translates to over 2.7 million fires 
annually.  In 2007, there were 1.24 million fires in the United States, leading to 3,240 fire 
deaths, for a property loss of $11.5 billion dollars (Karter, 2014).  This represents a 
47.74% reduction in the number of civilian deaths from fire and a 54.07% reduction in 
the number of fires overall.   
Firefighter Fatalities in the United States 
There is an inherent risk with firefighting (Burning, 1973).  According to America 
Burning, “Every fire is a gamble with the unknown, a venture into a unique complex of 
combustible materials and fire dynamics.  Risk substitutes for certainty, intuition for firm 
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knowledge” (Burning, 1973, p. 2).  In contrast to other occupations, which seek to avoid 
hazards, firefighting has a primary purpose of actively seeking out and engaging the 
hazards under extreme time pressure (Kunadharaju, Smith, & DeJoy, 2011).  There are 
common recommendations to lower firefighter fatalities in the United States which are 
not new information to fire service leaders, but rather are unheeded advice that maintains 
an annual 100 firefighter death toll (Moore-Merrell, Zhou, McDonald, Fisher, & Moore, 
2008). 
Francis Brannigan was quoted by Dr. Burton Clark as having said: “We are not 
killing firemen in any new ways” (2015, p. 46).  His meaning was that the 
recommendations of NIOSH reports and death investigations produce a familiar list of 
repeatedly unheeded recommendations, all with no power for implementation because 
NIOSH is a part of the CDC, which has no legal authority to sanction agencies for 
violations.  Clark continues by sharing that firefighters do not die due to a “lack of rules, 
lack of knowledge of the rules, or lack of training on the rules, or lack of ability to follow 
the rules” (2015, p. 46).  The rules for safety exist and are frequently identified as being 
broken on the path to an LODD. 
According to Kunadharaju, industries outside of the fire service employ layered, 
redundant systems for employee protection, where firefighters tend to have little depth to 
protective measures such that a single failure point can quickly lead to a catastrophic 
situation leading to firefighter injury or death (2011).  This diversity of single points of 
failure was reflected in the root-cause analysis.  Lack of standardized procedures and 
practices, lack of incident command or management was present in one-half of trauma-
related fatalities such as the fatality studied for this case.  Training and communication 
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were also key factors, intertwined with the lack of policies and procedures for managing 
an emergency incident.   
The routine work of firefighters includes unique hazards, including the risk of 
disorientation or entrapment while operating in an unfamiliar, burning, or unstable 
building, and physical stress and threats, all occurring within a hostile environment with a 
limited supply of breathing air. More specifically, 30% of structure fire related fatalities 
from the period 1998-2001 were as a result of a building collapse (excluding the events 
of 9/11/2001, where 341 firefighters and 2 fire marshals died as the result of a single 
incident), flashover or rapid fire progression resulted in the next 26% of structure fire 
LODDs, and 16% listed lost/disoriented and running out of air as the cause of death 
(Hodous, Pizatella, Braddee, & Castillo, 2004). 
  The top three recommendations for prevention in this same time period for these 
specific fatality types, based on NIOSH data compiled by Hodous et al., are to have 
standardized practices for fighting structure fires, have continuous communication 
between the outside of the structure and those operating on the interior, and to have crews 
ready to initiate the rescue of a trapped firefighter (2004).  Additional recommendations 
deal with the use of safety equipment and safety officers, having sufficient persons and 
maintaining accountability of all persons operating at a fire scene, and developing a 
strategy based on the fire conditions and structural conditions through the lens of risk-
versus-gain.  Out of these eight areas identified as frequent recommendations for all 
reports in the 1998-2001 period studied by Hodous, all could be applied to the case being 
studied here, with six out of eight of the recommendations from Hodous being explicitly 
or implicitly mentioned in the NIOSH report (NIOSH, 2011). 
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 The lack of ability for firefighters to assess and predict building collapse is a key 
factor which contributes to structural LODDs.  In the absence of such a tool, 
improvement in these areas could be made by incorporating the common prevention 
recommendations listed in the Hodous study (2004), plus additional specific information 
on building collapse listed in the NIOSH report for this fatality (NIOSH, 2011). 
Quantifying Firefighter LODDs 
One of the results of America Burning which greatly informed this study was the 
creation of the United States Fire Administration (Burning, 1973).  Since 1977, the 
United States Fire Administration (USFA) has tracked firefighter LODDs and reported an 
analysis back to the fire service (2014).  In 2004, the agency partnered with USFA 
primary stakeholders and set a goal to reduce on-duty firefighter fatalities by 25% in 5 
years, and 50% in 10 years (NFFF, 2010; Compton, 2008).  An on-duty fatality is defined 
as any injury or illness sustained while on-duty that proves fatal (NFFF, 2004).  
Beginning in December of 2003, these statistics also include personnel that died within 
24 hours of duty, because of the Hometown Heroes Act.  This act called for the inclusion 
of firefighters that died within 24 hours of an emergency response.  Before this act, the 
firefighter had to complain of or display symptoms before the termination of the 
emergency or shift to be included as an on-duty death (USFA, 2014). 
For the period of 1977 through 1979, the average number of firefighter deaths per 
year was 151.  For the 1980s, the average number of firefighter deaths per year was 127 
and dropped to an average of 99 firefighter deaths per year in the 1990s.  For the period 
2000 through 2009, the annual average was 110 (USFA, 2014).  This average excludes 
the 341 Fire Department of New York (FDNY) firefighters and 2 FDNY fire marshals 
26 
 
killed on September 11, 2001, at the World Trade Center.  Excluding the Hometown 
Heroes Act, the annual fatality rate per year (average of fatalities for the period 2000-
2009) for the same period is 102.1 per year (USFA, 2015).   
Table 2.1: List of Firefighter Fatalities by Year, 1990-2015 
Year 
Firefighter Fatalities (Source: 
































Smith found that the firefighter LODD rate is four times that of the general 
working populations, and 3.3 times that of workers across U.S. industries (2010).  
According to the U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), in 2013, there were 247 
workplace fatalities in the protective service occupations, with a 194% increase in 
firefighter fatalities.  Half of the increase attributed to two major LODD events in Texas 
and Arizona.  In the same period, fatalities for law enforcement in the U.S. dropped 20 
percent to a new low of 97 fatalities (BLS, 2014). 
While the number of annual fatalities overall appears to be decreasing, it must be 
considered relative to the overall decrease in the occurrence of fires to which departments 
respond.  Pessemier (2008a) calculated the number of firefighter deaths in terms of deaths 
per 100,000 fires.  He found that in the period from 1995 to 2004, firefighter deaths per 
year increased from 4.94 deaths per 100,000 fires to 6.64 deaths, an increase of 34 
percent.  Daniels (2005a) agreed that the number of firefighter fatalities has at least 
remained unchanged in the preceding three decades.  Dow, Garis, & Thomas have found 
that firefighter fatality numbers are increasing, and are reversing improvements made in 
the 1970s and 1980s (2013).  Kunadharaju, Smith, and DeJoy agree that there is an 
upward trend in firefighter LODD in the period 2000-2010 (2011).  Clark (2015) 
calculates firefighter deaths based on time at risk and found that firefighting is in a tie for 
the most deadly occupation with a ranking of 128.  He also calculated firefighter fatalities 
in terms of the number of fires, using fires as a unit of work production.  These 
calculations make firefighting 41 times more deadly than manufacturing, and 248 times 
more deadly than mining (Clark, 2015, p. 27).  These increases suggest that the current 
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systems in place for reducing firefighter LODDs are at best insufficient, and support the 
need for additional changes to lower this increasingly fatal trend. 
Daniels (2005a) asserted that until the fire service is willing to make substantial 
changes in training, procedures, equipment, and recruiting, this fatal trend shall continue.  
In some cases, the injurious behaviors may have originated as a bad habit that evolved 
slowly over time into a tradition, slowly injecting a poor practice or dangerous procedure 
into the fire department over generations (Gasaway, 2005).  Firefighters may engage in 
an unsafe act, thinking it is the correct way to operate or behave because the unsafe act or 
technique was how they were originally instructed (Gasaway), or because participating in 
violating safety rules without pejorative consequences reinforces the wrong behavior 
(Clark, 2015). 
In June of 2007, nine firefighters from Charleston, South Carolina, were killed in a 
fire in a sofa store.  In the initial report on changes that needed to be accomplished in the 
department to prevent a reoccurrence of a similar tragedy, one of the highest priority 
items was a change to the department’s culture (Routley et al., 2007).    Griffin (2013) 
studied the changes to the Charleston Fire Department following this fatality.  He 
identified that by studying the conditions leading up to an LODD, and the changes made 
within the organization as a result of the LODD, other fire departments can learn 
vicariously from these hard-won lessons.  He agreed that there was no existing literature 
relating to organizational changes made due to LODDs in a fire department. 
 In addition to the number of fatalities, firefighting also has a higher injury rate 
than other nations with similar practices, as well as a higher rate than the U.S.  Military.  
Peterson et al. identified over 95,000 injuries per year (2010), and Hodous et al. 
29 
 
supported this with a calculation of 90,000 injuries per year with an increasing rate of 
injury in the fire and emergency service (2004).  Brennan (2011) extracted the number of 
on-emergency-scene injuries to be 32,205 in 2009 and compared this to the number of 
members of the US Military who were wounded in combat.  In the period from October 
2001 through August 2008, there were 30,568 U.S. service members wounded in action- 
less than the number of firefighters injured in the single year 2009 (Brennan, 2011). 
 The deadly nature of the U.S. fire and emergency service is not just severe when 
compared to the U.S. Military in wartime.  In the decade 1990-1999, the United Kingdom 
(UK) had 33 line of duty deaths and less than 2500 injuries.  In that same period, the U.S. 
had 83,000 injuries, with just fewer than 50,000 of those occurring on the fireground 
(Daniels, 2005b).  In 2007, there were six firefighter fatalities in the UK, and in 2008 
there were none.  In the same period, there were 236 fatalities in the U.S. (Murphy, 
2011). Even accounting for differences between populations, The fire and emergency 
service has a poor track record of safety and must look for more efficient methods of 
service delivery that come at a lower human cost (Bruni, 2012).  
The Firefighter Life Safety Summit 
 The first Firefighter Life Safety Summit took place in March of 2004 brought 
together more than 200 fire service primary stakeholders to reduce firefighter on-duty 
deaths (NFFF, 2004).  This summit produced a list of 16 Life Safety Initiatives 
considered “essential to keep firefighters from dying unnecessarily” (NFFF, 2004, p. 2).  
The first initiative listed is to “Define and advocate the need for a cultural change within 
the fire service relating to safety” (NFFF, 2004, p. 4).  The participants unanimously 
agreed that this cultural change was the foundation of the other 15 initiatives, calling for a 
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fundamental change in how fire departments operate (NFFF, 2004).  The 16 Life Safety 
Initiatives are: 
1. Define and advocate the need for cultural change 
2. Enhance accountability for health and safety 
3. Improve risk management 
4. Stop unsafe practices 
5. National standards for training, qualifications, and certification 
6. Medical and physical fitness standards 
7. National research agenda 
8. Leverage technology for health and safety 
9. Thoroughly investigate all fatalities and injuries 
10. Implement safety through grant programs 
11. National standards for emergency response 
12. National protocols for response to violent incidents 
13. Access to counseling and psychological support 
14. Additional resources for public education 
15. Advocate for home fire sprinklers 
16. Safety as a design element for apparatus and equipment 
 
These initiatives were a sound and appropriate decision since most programs 
aimed at changing behavior fail if they do not take the underlying culture into account 
(Schein, 2000).  Ashkanasy further advocated that to be successful, parts of the culture 
that have value should be enhanced or rewarded, while detrimental portions should be 
downplayed (2000).  However, this requires an agreed definition of culture to anchor the 
discussion, and an agreed description of the specific areas of the culture that are in need 
of change (Schein, 2015). 
 At the center of this cultural change is the need for the fire service to cease 
accepting that 100 firefighters must die annually as a standard sacrifice or cost of 
responding to fires (NFFF, 2004).  This group set the goal for a 25% reduction in 
fatalities by 2009, and a 50% reduction in fatalities by 2014.   
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To summarize Section 1, there has been a 44% reduction in the number of civilian 
deaths from fires from 1973 to the present.  There has been a 40% reduction in the 
number of fires in the United States in the same period.  While there has been a 
fluctuation in the number of firefighter on-duty fatalities in this time, and a change in the 
definition of what constitutes an on-duty fatality, the reduction in firefighter deaths has 
not kept pace with the reduction in civilian death and fire loss.  The goal of a 25% 
reduction in five years and a 50% reduction in 10 years set by the USFA was not met.  
The organizational culture of the fire service has been connected to the failure to reduce 
firefighter line-of-duty deaths, but it has not been defined or described. 
 
Section 2: Culture, Organizational Culture, and American Fire Service Culture. 
 The current culture of the fire service must be described before the fire service 
can change that culture.  This section discusses the concept of culture in general, 
followed by a discussion of the construct of organizational culture, next narrowing to the 
literature dealing specifically with the organizational culture of the fire service.   
Culture 
 Schein (2004) described the culture of a group as the “basic, shared assumptions” 
(p. 17) learned by a group as it solves its problems.  He indicated that when this problem 
solving is successful, the methods are taught to new members as correct solutions to the 
problems (Schein).  Hofstede (2001) refered to these assumptions as the “collective 
programming of the mind” (p. 1).  Kluckhohn similarly defined culture as “patterned 
ways of thinking,” based on traditional and historical ideas (1951, p. 86).  Gagliardi is 
aligned with these three definitions, identifying culture as “a coherent system of 
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assumptions and basic values which distinguish one group from another and orient its 
choices” (1986, p. 119).  All four of these definitions identify culture as a process that 
occurs in the individual, based upon learned behaviors that are influenced by the 
organization.  Conceptual models from Schein (Figure 2.1) and Hofstede (Figure 2.2) are 
included here and Gagliardi’s model (Figure 1.2) is found in chapter 1. 






Figure 2.2: Hofstede’s “Onion” Model 
 
 
Duncan (1989) identified that culture itself is elusive and difficult to describe, and 
Cameron (2006) states that culture is often taken for granted.  An organization’s culture 
is reflected in the group’s internal characteristics, its character, and its daily existence 
(Goodman, Zammuto, Gifford, 2001).  Culture has a significant influence on the 
experiences of individuals that operate within it (Harris & Mossholder, 1996).  Gagliardi 
uses the term organizational culture to refer to both the value system and assumptions 
that the group utilizes to frame decisions, and behavior models, beliefs, symbols, 
technologies, and artifacts (1986). 
Culture in Organizations 
 Hofstede defined the construct of organizational culture as the “collective 
programming of the mind that distinguishes members of one organization from another” 
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(2001, p. 391).  Schein identified that culture exists at macro levels (national, ethnic, 
religious, occupational), organizational level, occupational level within groups, and at a 
microsystemic level below this (2004).  He described organizational culture as “the 
pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered, or developed in 
learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, and that 
have worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” 
(1984, p. 3).   
 Culture reduces anxiety by helping members of an organization classify and 
interpret the stimuli external to their immediate environment (Schein, 2012).  As culture 
in general differentiates different nations, culture of organizations differentiates different 
occupations.  However, there is no universal or single culture that describes all fire 
departments, law enforcement organizations, or military units (Soeters, 2000). 
 Chatman & Jehn (1994) completed research that offers empirical support that 
firms in the same industry share cultural similarities. Uniformed professions, such as 
police departments, fire departments, and military units have such a unique culture unto 
themselves that these organizations possess characteristics, such as a sense of duty and 
allegiance, which are not found in such a strong degree in other professions.  Gordon 
(1991) also supports this uniqueness of organizational culture and identifies it as a 
derivative of assumptions made about the customers of a given industry.   
Fire Service Organizational Culture 
Organizational cultures develop as subcultures as part of the normal evolutionary 
process in public sector organizations (Baker-Thompson, 2006).  Uniformed 
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organizations represent “specific occupational cultures that are relatively isolated from 
society” (Soeters, 2000, p. 465).  Archer (1999) triangulates this by his assertion that the 
fire service is “characterized by its strong culture” (p. 94) that includes the use of a 
uniform, hierarchical command structure, promotion solely from within the existing 
ranks, and long-standing traditions.  Fire departments further differ from other 
organizations in that they are exposed to uncommon levels of danger, work unusual 
schedules, require a lot from their members, and can recall staff and cancel their leaves 
(Soeters, 2000). 
Fire department, law enforcement, and military organizations have unique 
indoctrination procedures that inculcate their specific culture at special schools, 
acquainting members with the demands of the profession, as well as the special privileges 
that society affords to them (Soeters, 2000).  Some of these practices date back centuries, 
as military groups were some of the first formal organizations.  They are also 
characterized by a Janusian or two-sided organizational culture- one which has both 
emergency response/combat (hot) and non-emergency response/non-
combat/administrative (cold) aspects and functions to the work (Hofstede, 2000).     
Soeters identified three consistent aspects across police, fire and military group 
cultures as communal life, a hierarchical command structure, and strong discipline.  The 
feature of communal life that builds a unique and deep organizational culture is the 
immersive nature of it- a strong overlap between work activities and leisure activities 
with the same group of people, and a feeling that the rules that govern work time may 
also extend to leisure time activities.  The hierarchy of these organizations creates 
internal bureaucracies which rely on a rank structure to make decisions, which drives 
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decision-making frameworks within the organization.  Lastly, discipline, or the strong 
compliance with rules, orders, and authority within the organizational culture, can govern 
actions as a member of the police or military culture.  A difference between the military 
and police culture exists in the area of discipline since the police have a feedback 
mechanism from the public, where the military does not have a formal and consistent 
mechanism for such feedback (Soeters, 2000). 
These three aspects of organizational culture are reinforced by Ford (2012).  He 
identified traditions such as looking out for each other, working a particular shift, group 
rituals to begin the workday, company and department insignia and uniforms which all 
reinforce communalism.  Hierarchy is reinforced through choosing/bidding on shift 
schedules, new members washing the dishes, seniority, and differing rank insignia and 
dress (Ford, 2012).  Discipline has two distinct aspects- a formal discipline process 
utilizing formal HR practices and authorities, and an informal process which leverages 
small-unit consequences within a unit of the organization, outside of the formal process.  
This combination of history, structure, and indoctrination makes the fire service culture 
difficult or impossible to change (NFFF, 2014).   
In the introduction to the 2008 symposium “Reducing Firefighter Deaths and 
Injuries: Changes in Concept, Policy, and Procedure” Dr. John Granito opened with the 
statement that the fire service needs to focus on organizational culture amongst other 
concepts and constructs to lessen the LODD toll within the United States Fire Service.  
He reinforced that current cultural practices for fighting fires in general and aggressively 
entering buildings, in particular, wellness, and vehicle operations with are all areas where 
improvement is needed.  Smith (2010), Hodous et al. (2004), and the National Institute of 
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Standards and Technology (United States Department of Commerce, 2000) reinforce that 
the organizational culture of the fire service must change to reduce the annual toll of 
LODDs. 
This culture of the fire service has evolved through a complex process of group 
learning (Thompson & Bono, 1993).  In some cases in the fire service, methods espoused 
as solutions may be incorrect but perpetuated because they are viewed as traditions 
(Gasaway, 2005).   Culture does not drive the actions; it results from actions such as these 
(Schein, 2012).  The NFFF identified that fire department history and traditions can 
create a culture that is either difficult or impossible to change, and that fire departments 
may need to give up some freedom and better adhere to national standards to reduce 
LODDs (2014). 
Simpson (1996) furthered the uniqueness of the culture of volunteer fire 
departments, describing them as a cultural resource for a community, as a link to simpler 
days.  Lee and Olshfski described firefighters as unusually committed to their work, 
displaying a high level of pride (2002).  This high level of pride produces an environment 
of competition and risk taking (Lee & Olshfski, 2002).  Pessemier further complicates the 
view of fire department culture by stressing the local nature of these cultures (2012). 
 This image of the firefighter as a hero and extreme risk-taker is rooted in popular 
culture, with this concept washing over into the performance of duties based upon 
perceived public expectations of heroism, instead of actual job performance requirements 
(Eyre, 2014). This conception originated in the colonial fire departments, where the need 
for rapid response and competition to be the first to show up at a fire led members of fire 
departments to take great risk to arrive at the emergency scene and take control of the fire 
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quickly and with a lesser regard for personal safety (IFSTA, 2010).  This trade-off of 
speed versus safety was explored by Colley, Lincolne, and Neal (2013), who found that 
there were negative balances at both ends of the spectrum.  Following all rules can make 
it impossible to complete a job (such as fire suppression or victim rescue) promptly.  
Skipping steps or breaking rules can lead to increased risk of injury or death to the 
firefighter or his fellow firefighters, and could also lead to punitive organizational actions 
for failing to follow rules (2013).  Heroism as a basic value or assumption may be an 
impediment to developing the situational awareness necessary to mitigate safely high-
risk, low-frequency events such as fires, chemical releases, and other uncommon 
emergencies (Gasaway, 2013).  For the number of Line of Duty Deaths to decrease, there 
must be a de-emphasis on heroism, with a greater emphasis on safety (IFSTA, 2010).   
     Lewis (2004) juxtaposed this image against the culture of firefighting: 
Firefighters around the world are heroes in the hearts and minds of the 
public.  Nowhere was this more globally transparent than in the tragedy of 9/11 in 
New York.  However, research into the culture of firefighting worldwide has also 
shown disturbing and quite ‘uniform’ characteristics have been normalized by 
many under the guise of tradition (p. 6). 
 
Hulett et al. described the firefighting organizational culture as a perfect storm that 
has evolved slowly, resists change, encourages long-term employment, draws upon 
strong interpersonal connections, and takes pride in each of these areas (2008).  Baigent, 
a firefighter-turned-scholar, identified five key areas of masculine-friendly feminine-
exclusive organizational culture that are common in interactions between firefighters 
(2001): 
a. Ostracizing anyone different 
b. Ostracizing anyone who does not conform 
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c. Bullying and threatening anyone who resists the dominant group 
d. Excluding outsiders from fire station life 
e. Frequent joking as an instrument to continue bullying. 
 
Archer concurs with this description of the fire service culture and elaborates on 
what he calls the discipline code, which “is highly prescriptive, promotes… from within 
the organization only… has long-standing traditions, and is predominantly white-male 
dominated” (1999, p. 94).  He further discusses that this system is perpetuated through 
the cultural processes that individuals are introduced to when they go through the 
paramilitary style initial training.  When members leave the fire service, five of the seven 
major reasons for leaving all surround the organization’s culture (Whitney, 2012). 
Baker-Thompson furthered the idea of larger departments having multiple 
organizational cultures and subcultures (2006).  These might exist between different 
shifts, different stations, levels of membership, rank, or time on the department.  
Members of these differing cultures and subcultures may construct explanations and 
meanings that create a different reality than other group member’s experience.  Their 
emotional investment attached to these explanations and meanings can lead to change 
being viewed as challenging the status quo culture, leading to resistance (2006).  
On March 29, 2015, a Fresno California Fire Department officer was operating on 
the roof of a residential garage fire when the roof failed, and he plunged into the flames.  
The report released after that investigation states that the contributing factors to the 
serious injury were “too common across the country,” and “are those of the American 
Fire Service.”  The report further indicated that “Fire departments are made up of 
individuals.  A fire department cannot change its culture and as a result improve the 
40 
 
safety of its employees without the commitment of each collaboratively working 
together” (Fresno Fire Department Serious Accident Review Team, 2016, p. 19).  This 
report was one of the first to directly connect a serious injury back to the culture of a fire 
department and to review an injury with regards to fatality reports, finding 18 
recommendations to be frequent across a decade of national fatality investigations.  Of 
these 18, 12 are germane to the case being studied, despite the wide variance in 
department size, demographics, and type and victim age, experience, and rank. 
The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) produced a paper in 2013 
that identified five “Wicked Issues” that the fire service can no longer ignore.  Culture 
was one of the five issues identified, along with political acumen, cost efficiency, data, 
and deployment/staffing.  Similar to how the first Life Safety Initiative calling for 
cultural change from the National Fallen Firefighter’s Foundation undergirds the 
subsequent 15 initiatives; the IAFC has identified a parallel set of issues grounded in the 
fire service organizational culture.  Specifically, the IAFC agrees that the demand for fire 
department services is evolving, constantly changing, and less focused on fire 
suppression.  It identifies that the environment of service delivery in the fire service is 
changing, and addressing organizational culture is critical for success.   
Along with the IAFC, The United States Fire Administration (USFA) has added 
to the call for cultural change.  In 2014, the USFA and IAFC produced a collaborative 
paper called the National Safety Culture Change Initiative which looked at both positive 
and negative aspects of the culture of the fire service in the United States.  The three focal 
areas of the study were health and wellness with an emphasis on medical screening, 
vehicle safety in both emergency and personal vehicles, and incident risk management 
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(IAFC, 2014).  The overall objectives of this National Safety Culture Change Initiative 
are to support the need for cultural change in the fire service by advocating for the need 
to change at the organizational level by incorporating personal responsibility and 
department leadership (IAFC, In Press).  These same issues were identified by IFSTA as 
starting points in their discussion on cultural change as a part of overall occupational 
safety and health in the fire service (2010).   
Schein stated that entering an occupation “involves not only learning technical 
skills, but also adopting certain values and norms that define the occupation” (2004, p. 8).  
In support of this, Daniels (2005a) insisted that the reason that firefighters respond 
without wearing seatbelts, are assigned to positions that they are not fully trained for, and 
enter hazardous environments without taking advantage of mandated personal protective 
equipment is “simply culture” (p. 53).  Clark expanded this example of firefighters 
choosing to not wear seatbelts with the statement “We have the knowledge, we have the 
equipment, we have the standards, and we have the moral obligation,” but the fire service 
isn’t willing to impose a zero tolerance position to seatbelt use (Clark, 2015, p. 98). 
Once an organizational culture is established, elements are passed on to new FD 
members in their orientation, indoctrination, and onboarding.  Some items are shared in 
this phase while others are reserved until a new member is seen as a permanent member 
of the group (Schein, 2004) 
As a recent tragic example, failing to have adequate training before responding to 
emergencies was cited as a contributing factor in the West, Texas fertilizer plant 
explosion in 2013 (NIOSH, 2014).  Kluckhohn (1951) furthers this concept of culture as 
a choice by defining culture as a mental construct or conception which can be both 
42 
 
distinctly individual or a collective characteristic of a group, which influences how 
decisions are made.   
Wilderom, Glunk, & Maslowski (2000) remind us that organizational culture 
relates directly to organizational performance.  Therefore, since values are a component 
of culture, and culture predicts performance, changes to the values of the fire service 
must be done in a manner that does not have an adverse impact on the safety of the 
public.    
Pessemier debunked this idea that the high LODD tally in the fire service is the 
result of firefighters taking greater risks and saving more members of the general public 
by the US having comparable fire loss expenses to other nations, higher civilian death 
rates, and firefighter LODD rates that are 4-6 times those of the United Kingdom (2012).  
The UK provides a reliable comparison due to similar tactics, a similar fire problem, and 
collects similar data to the U.S. (2012). 
Kunadharaju et al. conducted an analysis of LODD investigations, and identified 
what he described as a cultural paradigm of firefighting.  This paradigm included 
“Operating with too few resources, compromising certain roles and functions, skipping or 
shortchanging certain operational steps and safeguards, and relying on extreme individual 
efforts and heroics” (2011, p. 1179).  He refers to these traits as long-standing traditions 
and how things have been done in the past, a form of normalization of deviance, more 
than a conscious, analytical choice to consistently engage in outdated or misapplied 
tactics, techniques, and procedures.  While he recognizes that there is some effectiveness 
in the model, it values speed over safety, and identifies the need for understating this 
organizational culture of the fire service as critical to reducing LODDs. 
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In their root cause analysis of firefighter LODDs, Kunadharaju, Smith, and DeJoy 
(2011) identified multiple areas of risk with singular or limited points of failure.  The 
authors argued that these causes “may actually be tapping the basic culture of 
firefighting” (p. 1179).  They outlined the competition between time-sensitive outcomes 
(victim rescue and fire suppression) against safety and implementation of a management 
system at an emergency scene, and link simplification of strategies through a lens of the 
organizational culture of a given department serving as blinders to potential hazards on 
the fireground.  This long-standing culture includes attributes such as “operating with too 
few resources, compromising certain roles and functions, skipping or shortchanging 
certain operational steps and safeguards, and relying on extreme individual efforts and 
heroics” (p. 1179). There is a high tolerance for risk, reinforced by past practices and 
inaccurate public perception, and a willingness for members of the culture to do whatever 
it takes to perform rescue and fire suppression activities.  This study was one of the first 
to not only identify a need for cultural change but to probe the extant literature for root 
causes.   
Unfortunately, this literature is largely limited to death investigations, and these 
investigations to not provide a deep or detailed analysis of the culture, adding credence to 
the position that the description of the organizational culture of the fire service has been 
widely neglected in the scientific literature.  This limited source material for 
Kunadharaju’s work is a specific limitation of their study, which considered over 213 
LODD at 189 incidents over the period from 2004 through 2009.  This case study is one 




Working Definition of Fire Department Organizational Culture 
The preceding literature substantiated that there is indeed a unique culture within 
organizations, specifically the U.S. Fire Service, which begins with a paramilitary 
orientation and indoctrination process.  This organizational culture can be changed, and 
the fire service history includes both positive and negative examples of such change.  
Successful change must be modeled at the highest levels of the organization, and the 
change must be reinforced at all levels throughout the organization.  Changing culture is 
discussed in greater detail in the next section, but before moving forward a definition for 
what the organizational culture of a fire department is. 
For this study, Chief Dennis Compton’s definition for the organizational culture 
of a fire department was be utilized.  It includes “all the behaviors, ideas, attitudes, and 
values shared by a group” of firefighters which is transmitted to current, new, and future 
members of the group (Compton, 2010).  This definition is additionally inclusive of the 
assumptions, beliefs, observable traits, expressed rationales, strategies, stories, heroes, 
and traditions of a group of fire service members at a specific bounded level.  These traits 
may be expressed through the organization’s history, appearance, facilities, vocabulary, 
leadership, management, and supervisory approach and practices (Compton).   
Values 
 While this study focused on the Modes of Implementation of an organization’s 
culture, a definition of values as the core of the model is necessary to ground the model in 
the literature.   
Schein described three components of culture:  Artifacts, espoused beliefs and 
values, and basic underlying assumptions.  Assumptions are taken for granted, not 
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debatable, and not able to be confronted, and values are a group’s stance on what is right 
and wrong, what will and will not work (2004).  Hofstede defines values as broad 
tendencies to prefer certain situations and outcomes to others (Hofstede, 2001).  Patterns 
of culture are rooted in values, which make up culture, along with symbols, heroes, and 
rituals (Hofstede, 2000).   
According to Soeters, values in the fire service are not distinct between personal 
and professional life (2000).  This differs from most other professions, where it is 
expected that individuals have different values between personal and professional values, 
and only one value system in each area.  Lang (1965) further describes the values in the 
fire service as a form of communalism, where individuals tend to seek out the same 
employment as their parents, tend to not look very far into the future (expecting the 
organization to do that for them), and select members based upon ties to the existing 
community.  Soeters (2000) and Lang (1965) both also suggested that the organization’s 
values reflect the national culture and values.  Values that are as deeply rooted as these 
are most difficult to change (Gagliardi, 1986). 
Deep organizational culture as found in a fire department is subject to change by 
an individual to the extent that the individual permits the values to be changed 
(Stackman, 2000).  Using a paramilitary or boot camp environment to onboard and 
homogenize new employees helps to change individual values to align with those of the 
organization (Stackman, 2000) and serves to offer intense exposure to the values of the 
organization (Hofstede, 2000).  The fire service uses these techniques to indoctrinate new 
members.  This indoctrination process can be so complete those new firefighters often 
feel disenchanted when they leave the academy setting and are exposed to fire station life 
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because the adventure and excitement that characterized the training environment is not 
reflective of the station environment (Hofstede, 2000).   
Theories of Cultural Change 
 Several models for organizational cultural change exist in the literature, but the 
unique aspects of this case warrant a model that allowed the researcher to understand the 
organization before and after the LODD, allowed for the study of an unplanned change, 
and took into account that there is a unique organizational culture present.  Wilkins and 
Dyer reinforced this by identifying that a one-size-fits-all model of cultural change is 
inappropriate, as it does not account for unique characteristics, organizational history, the 
environment, and the organization’s strategies (1988).  With an organization that has the 
deep history and unique culture and characteristics as a fire department, matching the 
model for cultural change with the unique aspects of the organization is especially 
important.  The model for organizational cultural change must be tailored to the 
organization, taking into account these individual variables (Wilkins & Dyer, 1988).  
 The work of Linda Smircich reinforced this need to match the model for cultural 
change with the specific attributes of the organization.  She regarded this work as an 
intersection between organization theory and anthropology, with five major themes in the 
literature at the time.  These five themes are comparative or cross-cultural management, 
corporate culture, organizational cognition, organizational symbolism, and unconscious 
processes and organization (1983).  Her theme of corporate culture is the closest fit for 
this study, demonstrating that an organization produces its own culture as a product of its 
existence.  However, her work stops short of advocating for models of cultural change 
but does offer touch points of the culture that must be considered for change to occur.   
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Silvester, Anderson, and Patterson shared that there is a lack of theoretical models 
for organizational culture change (1999).  Their work studied organizational culture as 
the central focus for organizational change through an exploratory case study using a 
socio-cognitive model.  Their research using this model was focused at stratified levels 
within the organization, aimed at measuring perceptions of a cultural change program at 
the management, trainer, and worker levels.  They found that a single-shot program for 
cultural change could result in a positive intentional change at the technical and 
behavioral levels, with the technical change being more successful than higher-order 
changes.  While this illustrates that change is possible, it reinforces that large-scale 
change, even when well-planned, can have results that fall short of the intended goal. The 
model used was appropriate for planned change, but less so for studying the impact of 
unplanned change, where accurate pre-change survey data is less available. 
Schein identified that organizations may deny change even when necessary to 
avoid the discomfort and lack of psychological safety caused by the change (2004).  In 
this case, there may have been a subconscious suppression of the need to accelerate the 
initial changes the chief began, and to strategically seek other areas where change was 
needed (2004). 
Given that this case study involved a fatal incident, the work of DeJoy was 
considered due to his experience with organizational cultural change concerning 
occupational safety (DeJoy, 2005; Kunadharaju et al., 2011).  He identifies that a culture 
change approach can be effective to address safety issues by identifying the root causes 
of unsafe behaviors while cautioning that these methods must be applied to more than 
just the top levels of the organization, and must be tied back to the specific culture of the 
48 
 
organization.  His studies produced an overlapping mode for cultural change with regards 
to safety, with management changes or emphases “trickling down” to the workers, and 
front-line worker safety behavior changes “bubbling up.” This model emphasizes the 
need for cultural change, places this model within an integrated approach, but doesn’t 
address the details of how the cultural change can be implemented and led.  Like both 
Schein (2004) and Gagliardi (1986), DeJoy links the organizational culture to how the 
organization solves problems (2005). 
Cultural change strategies are traditionally aimed at improving processes or 
products in a thoughtful manner resulting in a change in a culture (first order change), or 
aimed at resolving an extant crisis which calls for a fundamental change of culture 
(second order change) (Scott, Mannion, Davies, & Martin, 2003).  The key distinction is 
the need to change an outcome proactively versus a need to change as a result of a crisis, 
such as an LODD.  The latter typically requires organization-wide change instead of 
focusing on one aspect of a system or organization and is a more complex process.  In the 
fire service, change is most readily accepted by an agency that has experienced an 
LODD, and by those close to the event because the need for change is clear (Ford, 2012). 
Changing Organizational Culture- Gagliardi’s Conceptual Framework 
The preceding review substantiated that there is a unique organizational culture 
within the fire service and that this distinct culture must be changed to reduce LODDs 
within the fire service.  Gagliardi’s model is a model that acknowledges the dynamic 
nature of a deeply-rooted organizational culture (Hatch, 2004).  His model builds upon 
and expands Schein by relating culture to organizational strategy. 
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Gagliardi agreed with the view that organizational cultures are the result of 
dynamic organizational learning, and he developed a model to study if the organizational 
culture does change when the underlying assumptions change (1986).  He considered the 
two positions that Schein offered as efforts to change organizational culture- positive 
problem solving and anxiety avoidance and found that organizational change is not so 
clean that it can be easily separated into these two categories to enable a successful 
planned organizational change.  Schein agreed that there is a level of intertwining 
between the two concepts, but Gagliardi is more specific that the two concepts are 
irrevocably interrelated, finding that Schein’s approach holds true for matters involving 
scientific knowledge, but less for change dealing with more tacit knowledge.  Gagliardi 
offered that some deeply-rooted aspects of culture such as values and beliefs cannot be 
exchanged for a different value or belief to cause change.  Instead, they must be replaced 
with new but complementary values and beliefs at the deepest level of organizational 
culture to allow for changes in primary and secondary organizational strategies, and more 
superficially organizational outputs.   
 Schein, Hofstede, and Gagliardi stratified the levels of organizational culture in 
similar ways, reflected earlier in figures 1.2, 2.1, and 2.2.   
Gagliardi proffered that there were more options for cultural change, and greater 
potential for change, with aspects of the organizational culture proportional to the 
distance from the basic values.  His model is an inverted pyramid, ranging from modes of 
implementation at the widest part of the pyramid, instrumental and expressive strategies 
at the second level down, primary strategy at the third level towards the base, and 
assumptions and basic values at the narrowest point of the inverted pyramid.   
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Modes of implementation- behaviors within the organization- would have the 
most acceptable options and require the least energy to change a specific practice, since 
these practices have a stronger foundation in scientific knowledge, and are more prone to 
direct observation and measurement.  Fire suppression tasks, the step-wise performance 
of the work of the fire department, would be examples of such Modes of Implementation.  
Kimple supported that practices for both emergency and non-emergency response can be 
modified at this level in a move towards safer fireground operations (2013). 
 The next level of potential for action lies in instrumental and expressive 
strategies, which are the activities between actual practices/work and the maintenance of 
the organization’s culture, which is the Primary Strategy.   The third and increasingly 
harder aspect of organizational culture to change is the primary strategy.  According to 
Gagliardi, the Primary Strategy of organizational culture is to resist change.  
Additionally, the more deeply embedded the Assumptions and Basic Values (fourth and 
lowest level of the pyramid) are in the Primary Strategy, the more change-resistant the 
organization is likely to be.  The Assumptions and Basic Values are the very fabric of 
what the organization is and does.  This area is most rooted in mythical knowledge, with 
few if any explicit reasons for the creation of these values are evident.  Kimple supports 
that values and belief at the core of the fire service model, and believes that changes can 
be made here without impacting the delivery of emergency services (2013). 
Meyerson and Martin also identified organizational cultures as being resistant to 
change and being changeable in small, incremental steps (1987).  They close the gap 
between an organization’s culture and the organization, identifying the culture as one 
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with the organization.  Hatch supports this difficulty to change some cultures, by sharing 
that the more stable the culture is, the harder it is to integrate change (2004). 
For success in making a change in this milieu, Gagliardi offered a concept he 
called Cultural Incrementalism, where the basic values aren’t changed, but the number 
and scope of options to change tactics within the current values and assumptions is 
expanded.     Meyerson and Martin supported the idea of cultural incrementalism, 
identifying small cultural changes as being more likely to be successful (1987).  This 
incrementalism is reflected by the red arrows in the blue triangle in Graphic 4, and 
involves selecting additional values that aren’t antagonistic to the existing ones, but 
different from them, and leveraging these expanded values to create new opportunities 
and solutions.  He suggested adding an additional value without removing an existing one 
as a way to augment the Primary Strategy, which in turn allows for greater options for the 
Secondary (Instrumental and Expressive) Strategies, and ultimately additional acceptable 
options for the delivery of firefighting services in a manner acceptable to the 
organization’s culture.  Because values are hierarchical and not independent of each 




Figure 2.3: Gagliardi’s Model for Culture Creation and Change: 
Gagliardi’s work described how an organizational culture maintains aspects such as 
those shared by Archer, Baigent, and others.  These “deeply rooted” cultures rely heavily 
on tradition and mythical knowledge (Gagliardi, 1986) and are difficult to change 
(Meyerson & Martin, 1987).  He states that success reinforces organizational values, and 
leads to an idealized organizational culture.  This idealization can lead to a lack of 
changing an organization’s culture, as the indications of cultural stress or failure are 
minimized because they contradict the culture, or they are substituted by other aspects of 
the culture (1986).  In these ways, from the initial indoctrination to the day-to-day aspects 
of the fire department, the thick organizational culture plays a significant role in 
maintaining the organization as it currently exists.  Gagliardi sums this up with the 
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statement “Organizational cultures change to remain what they have always been” (1986, 
p. 126). 
Gagliardi states that the more deeply rooted the values and assumptions are, the 
greater the organizational cost for the cultural change, and the less likely the change will 
remain after reinforcement activities have been relaxed.  Firefighting culture forms such 
deep rooted, adamant intra-group bonds because the work they perform calls for them to 
function as a cohesive unit in the execution of emergency response operations (Moran & 
Roth, 2013).  Of the three primary models considered (Hofstede, Schein, and Gagliardi), 
Gagliardi’s foundation in Schein’s model and similar levels to Hofstede’s model, along 
with the experience with entrenched cultures being changed via cultural incrementalism 
makes this model a good candidate for this study. 
An important point made by Hofstede (2000) is that one way to change the values 
of a uniformed organization such as the fire service is to recruit more employees with 
values that are different or independent from the organization.  Soeters and Boer (2009) 
found this to be the case to help reduce military aircraft accidents.  By incorporating more 
civilians and fewer persons that had been indoctrinated into the military’s organizational 
culture, a shift towards a safer work environment ensued, and the number of aircraft 
accidents was reduced. 
For illustration, the Phoenix Fire Department has shifted from a transactional 
service model to one of building longer term and deeper relationships by shifting from 
the basic value of “for service” to “for building long-term relationships” (Schneider, 
Bowen, Ehrhart, & Holcombe, 2000).  Other methods suggested for lasting 
organizational change in the fire service are the Lewin change model, Kotter’s eight-step 
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change model, a five-step model consisting of Identify, Select, Design, Implement, and 
Evaluate, Social Change Model, and Social-Marketing Model (IFSTA, 2010).  While 
IFSTA identified that these methods have been used in the fire service, according to the 
author there is no support in the literature of studies supporting their effectiveness in the 
organizational culture of a fire department. 
Gagliardi further postulates that organizations do not learn from negative 
experiences without outside help and influences, for example from a person or group that 
can make decisions and observations from outside of the host organization’s values and 
assumptions.  In this model, internal change agents can identify and influence change at 
the outer edge of the model, but external change agents are necessary to create lasting 
change at the roots of the organizational culture.  Kunadharaju reinforces this, calling for 
an increased study of culture in the course of Line of Duty Death investigations by 
federal agencies (2011).   
Even with an external change agent, basic values and assumptions do not change 
if the members of the culture cannot or will not surrender the old values for the new ones.  
These are cases of what Gagliardi (1986) refers to as Cultural Revolution, versus cultural 
change.  For lasting change to organizational culture to occur, he identifies three 
conditions that must be present for this model to work: 
1. New competencies, practices, and skills must be aligned with existing values, or 
new values must be added to support the new competencies. 
2. The organization must experience success as a result of the new skills, 
competencies, and practices, and 




Chapter 2 Synthesis 
A closing thought from Geert Hofstede (2000) serves as a fitting end to the 
discussion of the organizational culture in the fire service, and the need for a shift in these 
cultural touchstones to reduce on-duty fatalities.  “Uniformed organizations have to 
balance their attempts to introduce new ways of working… with the necessity of 
preserving traditional basics.  Changing uniformed cultures requires patience and 
wisdom” (p. 481).   It is the intent of this research to develop some of the wisdom 
necessary to effect a positive change in the fire service by reducing the number of Line of 
Duty Deaths through first understanding the existing organizational culture of the fire 
department, and discovering how that fire department effected positive change using 




Chapter 3: Research Methods 
Despite a decrease in the number of fires, better protective clothing, and fewer 
civilians dying in fires, there has not been a corresponding decrease in firefighter Line-of-
Duty Deaths (LODDs).  This study employed a qualitative research design using a 
phenomenological case study method to describe one Midwestern fire company.  Within 
the case, the organizational culture which undergirds the decisions and relationships in 
the fire department was studied.  This chapter describes the research procedures used for 
the study.  
The chapter is divided into thirteen major areas:  Introduction, Research 
Questions, Research Design and Methods, Case Selection, Validity and Reliability, Data 
Triangulation, Data Collection, Data Management, Data Analysis, Participants, 
Researcher Background, Human Subject Protection, and concludes with a summary. 
Restatement of the Research Questions 
Three research questions guided this study: 
RQ 1: What were the Modes of Implementation of the organizational culture of the fire 
department in 2010?  
RQ 2: What were the Modes of Implementation of the organizational culture of the fire 
department in 2015?  
RQ 3: Did the organizational culture of the department change from 2010 to 2015?  
Research Design and Method 
This study employed a qualitative design and case study method.  Qualitative 
methods are best to describe, decode, and come to terms with the meaning of a naturally 
occurring phenomena in the social world.  The raw materials of the study originate in the 
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daily environment of the subjects (Van Maanen, 1979).  The process of qualitative 
research begins with the bracketing of a time and place to bound the study (1979). 
Creswell defined a case study as: 
… an exploration of a “bounded system” or a case over time through detailed, in-
depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in context.  The 
bounded system is bounded by time and place... Multiple sources of information include 
observations, interviews… and documents and reports.  The contest of the case involves 
situating the case within its setting, which may be a physical setting (Creswell, 1998, p. 
61-62). 
 
This case study was of the organizational culture of one fire department, as 
portrayed and described by the members of that department.  The research focused on the 
people and events within this fire company, with consideration given to the environment 
and surroundings in which the fire company exists, and were time-bound to the events 
before and after the June 2011 Line of Duty Death (LODD).  Two time periods were 
compared- fall 2010 and fall 2015. 
The case study method is best suited for this study because it allowed the 
researcher to explore operational linkages within the organization over a period of time, 
and allowed the researcher to consider and explore a broad selection of evidence in the 
data collection phase (Yin, 2009).  The case study was also appropriate for this situation 
because the study looked at the relationship between an event and the conditions 
surrounding it, in this case, the LODD and the impact on the organizational culture of the 
fire department (Farmer & Rojewski, 2001; Van Mannen, 1998).   This study is interested 
in if a change occurred in the Modes of Implementation, how a model fits that change, 
and the study considered linkages between two time periods, all questions that are better 
answered through a case study (Yin, 2009, Stake, 1995, Mulenga, 2001) 
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A case study is further warranted for this study because the subject builds around 
the in-depth review of a contemporary phenomenon- the death of a firefighter.  This 
death were studied in its real-life context, where the boundaries between the death itself 
and the context and impact of that death are not clearly evident (Yin, 2009).  Some data 
emerged through interviews and observations collected from multiple sources (Stake, 
1995, Creswell, 1998).  Lastly, while there have been no research studies of single 
firefighter LODD, there has been one study of a nine-firefighter LODD using the case 
study method (Griffin, 2013).  Griffin sought to understand if a change had happened, not 
how or why.   Like Griffin, a researcher with a combined background in firefighting and 
scholarship can be successful in such a study (Van Maanen, 2011) 
The research method was a single, holistic case study.  According to Yin (2009) 
and Creswell (2009), this method was appropriate because it represents an extreme or 
unique case.  This method allowed the researcher to examine a contemporary event 
without manipulating the environment while showing a larger perspective of the event 
and impact of the event.  Using this approach the researcher was able to employ 
observations, group and individual semi-structured interviews, and document reviews to 
explore and develop a rich description of the fire personnel invited to participate in the 
study.  This approach also allowed for a greater understanding of the case to appreciate 
its uniqueness and complexity. 
According to Mulenga, while exploratory case study research must also be 
structured and focused (2001).  The structure was ensured by using standardized tools for 
data collection and interviews to ensure consistency.  Focus were maintained by seeking 
answers within the boundaries of the case, and adjusting the limits if/as necessary.  The 
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goal is to answer the research questions, and not to capture everything that ever happened 
in this case.  The tools used in this study were pilot tested in 2009-2010 during a different 
case study of a fire department, and refined with input from other experienced researchers 
and advisers following that study. 
In an instrumental case study such as this, the research questions are selected first, 
before a case is chosen (Stake, 1995).  Some issues related to the research questions 
flowed from the case selection, and others may present themselves as the case is studied.  
This method is further supported by Stake since a single case study design can be utilized 
to obtain meaningful data and an understanding of a complex phenomenon when 
resources are limited (1995). 
This study employed a cultural study research design.   This design is appropriate 
because a study of culture needs to be exploratory, given the complex nature of the topic.  
The absence of extant published research on the topic gives further justification for a 
qualitative approach to the topic.  Additionally, the research data were verbal and 
observational in nature and requires interaction on the part of the researcher to study the 
values in action in their natural setting (Patton, 1990). 
The case study method is further warranted because the researcher has no control 
over the firefighter’s individual behavior, or the behavior of the group of firefighters, or 
the fire company. The researcher also cannot control the occurrence of emergency events.  
This study had a strong focus on contemporary events (Swanson, 2005) and allowed the 
researcher to identify themes and patterns of the case (Gall, 2007) which bear on the 
values of this fire company.   
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A case study allowed an in-depth, holistic study of the selected case (Creswell, 
1998) while allowing latitude to explore the situation in detail (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  The 
study of a critical event such as an LODD represents an extreme, unique case and is best 
revealed by a case study (Yin, 2009, Creswell, 1998, Flyvbjerg, 2006).  Data sources for 
a study like this one are observational, verbal, and need to be studied in situ (Patton, 
1990; Creswell, 1998).  The flexibility of a case study also allowed the exploration of any 
positive deviance in the case, which aided in connecting this study into other cases 
(Patterson and others; Stake, during class).  The case study method also permitted 
context-dependent general knowledge of a complex situation (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Mulenga 
2001). 
This method could have been limited if the case turned out to be substantially 
different than originally anticipated (Yin, 2009).  To prevent this vulnerability, the case 
was screened before being finalized to understand the milieu of the case and limit 
potential major ethical, moral, or legal issues.  Multiple cases were considered and 
narrowed down to ensure the best fit for the study of a successful change to a fire 
department’s organizational culture.  The selection process was based on the 
geographical location, researcher access to the organization, media reports surrounding 
the death, and a lack of controversy and litigation surrounding the case and published 
reports.   
Additionally, sufficient interviewees were still living in the area, and available to 
the researcher, and they were willing to meet with the researcher.  Finally, the researcher 
reviewed the case during the selection process and throughout the case study process to 
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ensure that the model, method, and design remain appropriate and were useful in 
explaining the situation of the case. 
Criticisms of case study research exist, some of which are more misconceptions 
which can be addressed through thoughtful planning.  To increase the value of proper and 
rigorous case selection, consistent and detailed data collection, thoughtful coding, 
through triangulation, and a structured reporting plan were closely adhered to (Flyvbjerg, 
2006).  The upcoming section addresses case selection, and a detailed plan for data 
collection, coding, and triangulation are shared in the next sections. 
Case Selection 
Case Selection began by defining a geographic limit of departments within a 
driving distance of 250 miles of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, which 
creates an area of roughly the states of Illinois and Indiana.  The incident type sought was 
a fireground, non-medical LODD, as this was more likely to result in the type of 
organizational change sought for this study.  Next, the availability of NIOSH reports 
regarding the fatality was used as selection criteria, since the prevalence of 
recommendations in the NIOSH is a point of comparison and analysis for LODDs in the 
existing literature.  Lastly, the researcher accessed the United States Fire Administration 
(USFA) database of firefighter fatalities, which contains cases from 2003 and the data set 
ended (at the time of case selection) with 2012.   
The search criteria put into the USFA database at apps.usfa.fema.gov/firefighter-
fatalities/fatalitydata/reportbuilder were as follows:   
 Year:  2003-2012.   
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 State of Fatal Injury:  Illinois and Indiana (search was run once for each state, as 
multiple states could not be selected). 
 Gender: Both genders 
 Age Range: All ages 
 Classification: (refers to the type of fire department) All classifications 
 Cause of Fatal Injury: All Types 
 Type of Fatal Injury: All Types 
 Type of Duty:  On-Scene Fire 
 Type of Activity: All Types 
 Type of Incident:  Structure Fire 
 Fixed Property Use:  All Properties 
 Additional Filters: No other filters were selected 
This report generated four fatalities in Indiana, and 11 in Illinois, for a total of 15 
incidents meeting the initial criteria.  Reports and newspaper accounts of these 15 
incidents were obtained and reviewed.  Non-traumatic causes of death and types of fatal 
injury were eliminated from the search, which eliminated three cases where 
stress/overexertion was the cause, 3 cases where a heart attack was the cause, and 7 cases 
of asphyxiation.  Note that there was overlap in the categories of Cause of Fatal Injury 
and Nature of Fatal Injury.  After removing the medical cases, 5 cases remained, 3 of 
which were traumatic injuries, and the other two were crush injuries.   
 Since the five remaining fatalities were in Illinois, the next layer of scrutiny used 
the Illinois Firefighter Line of Duty Death (IFLODD) Database at the University of 
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Illinois Fire Service Institute Library.  While the USFA database does not identify 
specific fire departments or individuals, by searching for the same criteria used in the 
USFA search in the IFLODD database, departments and individuals are identified.  
Applying the same search criteria used in the USFA search, five results were returned.  
The date range of LODDs returned in the IFLODD database were identical to those 
returned in the USFA search.  Of the 5, once the incident was classified in both databases 
as occurring at a fire scene, but was vehicular in nature.  Of the remaining four cases, 
three were in the City of Chicago, and one was in Downstate Illinois.  All four had 
reports filed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) with 
details of the LODD and recommendations for prevention.   
All four NIOSH reports were reviewed for the specific information of the case.  
The size of the fire department that experienced the fatality was considered, along with 
the complexity of the cases.  The three Chicago cases would be difficult to study 
completely with the resources available.  The researcher then began to collect additional 
information about the remaining case, including attending a seminar led by the fire chief 
which focused on the LODD event.  After attending this event, the researcher met with 
the fire chief, shared information about this research project, and received initial approval 
and willingness from the fire chief to assist with the study. 
The final selection criterion was to determine if there had been an organizational 
change within the organization as a result of the fatality.  The remaining case in Southern 
Illinois was selected as a viable case after a discussion with peers of the researcher 
indicated that there had been an organizational cultural change in the department 




Once the case was selected, the boundaries of the case had to be defined, along 
with what was meant by “fire department organizational culture.”  For this study, Chief 
Dennis Compton’s definition for the organizational culture of a fire department was 
utilized.  It includes “all the behaviors, ideas, attitudes, and values shared by a group” of 
firefighters which is transmitted to current, new, and future members of the group 
(Compton, 2010).   
Fire department organizational culture can be described at the macro level (all fire 
departments in the world, in a nation, in a state, or in a region) if broad general 
characteristics are used, and the organizational culture can be described at a micro level 
(pairs, teams, or companies of firefighters, stations, districts, divisions, battalions, or 
departments) if more discrete criteria are applied.  This study considered the Du Quoin 
Fire Department as the group for analysis, with input from outside persons to aid in 
triangulation and data validity. 
Data Quality 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) described four measures for judging the soundness of 
qualitative research and offer them as alternatives to external validity, internal validity, 
objectivity, and reliability.  These measures are Credibility, Transferability, 
Dependability, and Confirmability 
Credibility is based upon establishing that the results are credible or believable by 
participants and by the community at large.  This were addressed by having the fire 
company members review the results before publication to ensure that the interview 
results are accurate, the conclusions are supported by the data, and the data is credible.  
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An informant and critical friends in the fire service, as well as the researcher's advisor 
and committee, also contributed to ensuring to a reliable result.  This method would 
equate to internal validity in a quantitative study. 
External validity is achieved through Transferability.  This were determined by 
how representative the data is to the entire fire service.  Since the study is qualitative, 
generalizability was inherently limited.  However, aspects of the case study should be 
familiar to other fire agencies, even if the entire case is not.  The thick, rich description 
developed as a result of the case study could allow transferability by offering 
characteristics that could be familiar within other fire companies.  Some, but not all, of 
the report may apply to other fire companies.  Generalizability is not a goal of this 
research, and external validity is the least important of the four measures of validity and 
reliability in this study.   
Dependability calls for the researcher to ensure that the data is correct and in 
context for the study, ensuring that the methods used are appropriate for the research 
questions (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  As discussed above, the method of case study is well 
matched to the research questions and issues, and the data collected were triangulated as 
discussed in a later section to maximize accuracy and dependability.  These two facets 
allowed the researcher to develop the case within the context that it occurs.  While the 
case is dynamic, the researcher seeks to portray an accurate slice of time using these 
methods.  Chart 1, Research Methods Correlated with the Research Questions, shows the 
anticipated methods for the parts of the guiding research questions. 
Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) last indicator is Confirmability, or the ability for the 
data to be verified and repeated.  This indicator is also referred to as “objectivity” 
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(Marshall & Rossman, 1989).   To ensure this trait for this study, an audit trail was 
maintained so that the full records of activities related to this study were captured and 
available to other researchers.  This audit trail includes rough and final notes, coding 
devices, and initial categorization forms.  To aid in Confirmability, the study considered 
the most observable part of Gagliardi’s model, the Modes of Implementation (MOI).  
These are the most scientific aspects of behaviors that were recorded in observations and 
captured during interviews.  Schein supported this level of analysis by referring to 
Gagliardi’s model and stating that going deeper requires the researcher and the subjects 
to have an understanding of the “deep assumptions of the culture… and you can only test 
a person’s insight into what something may mean if the person has also experienced the 
culture at the deepest level of assumptions (2004, p. 24).   
While no study can be a completely accurate depiction of the organizational 
culture of the fire company studied, through adherence to the constructs of Credibility, 
Transferability, Dependability, and Confirmability this research strives to be as true and 
accurate as possible.  Additionally, the level of analysis was bounded by the MOIs while 
not being superficial, avoiding the trap of developing a deep understanding from insights 
that may not be present from the brief time spent with the department for this study. 
Data Collection 
This study relied heavily on fieldwork.  Van Maanen advocates for fieldwork as a 
primary source of data for “little understood and out of the ordinary” cultures such as fire 
departments (1998, p. 31).  Fieldwork allowed the meanings and practices produced and 
sustained by the group as Modes of Implementation to richly erupt in the narrative.  
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 Because data collection is emergent in case study research, there was no precise 
moment when the gathering begins (Stake, 1995).  Some data was necessary to screen 
cases for selection.  For this researcher, the study drew upon his expertise in the fire 
service and his experiences as a Human Resource Development student for the previous 
decade as well as the information collected in the study.  As is common with case studies, 
data were drawn from interviews, documents, and historical records as well as researcher 
observation (Stake, 1995). 
The study began with document review and observation, and on the researcher’s 
second visit to the site interviews were conducted.  Interviews had some core questions 
asked of each member using an interview guide, and also had specific content to each 
member of the fire company based on observations, perceptions, and the member’s time 
and position within the company.  The interviews were tied back to the research 
questions and issues, but also leave the researcher time and space to follow the discussion 
where it leads. 
Chart 2: Research Methods Correlated with The Research Questions diagrams 
which methods are expected to be used for each research question.  Two strategies for 
data collection used within these methods were adopted from Gall, Borg, and Gall 
(1996).  Standardized forms were used to collect each of the three types of data, and these 
forms are included in the appendices.  The research plan also called for the interviewer to 
probe during questions when the interviewee had more to say.  This provided a thick 
description, deeper details, and direct quotations which helped to begin to formulate a 
mental image of the data, allowing the researcher to begin to anticipate categories for 
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The documents reviewed included the department’s governing documents, 
including its mission and vision statements, Standard Operating Guidelines/Procedures 
(SOGs/SOPs), policy manuals, union contract, and historical documents.  The latter 
documents were used to add depth to the situation that the fire company works in, as both 
the union contract and the department’s history shed light on the current state of affairs.  




 The fire department building in general was directly observed by the researcher 
on the first and second visits.  Field notes were taken on a standard form to allow for 
easier analysis and organization.  The station, equipment, and living areas were 
documented.  Observations were used to triangulate data collected from both the 
document review as well as interviews.  The researcher observed the fire company 
members during their performance of routine work in their fire station, during training, 
and while out in the community for non-emergency reasons.  These observations were 
triangulated through interview data.  Field notes were organized shortly after the 
collection while the event is still fresh in the researcher’s mind to minimize data loss.   
Interviews 
The last method of data collection gathered was interviews of each participating 
member of the fire company.  Each firefighter and interview participant had their unique 
story to tell which contributes to a deeper understanding of the case.  Interviews began 
with a discussion of the research itself, and a review of the informed consent form.  This 
introduction was followed by straightforward demographic questions to establish rapport 
and help both the researcher and the interviewee become at ease with each other.  Next, 
semi-structured open-ended questions drawn from an interview guide provided 
consistency between interviews for triangulation of core information while allowing the 
researcher to tease out details about specific answers provided by the interviewee.  This 
structure allowed each interviewee to share the uniqueness of his or her role and position 
in relation to the company as a whole.  These questions were provided in advance to 
allow the company members to reflect and prepare for the interview, and to lessen their 
anxiety during the interview.  Lastly, each interviewee was asked some questions specific 
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to his or her role in the fire company.  All interviews were digitally recorded, and 
transcribed verbatim then checked for accuracy by another person.  The interviewees 
were given an opportunity to review the transcript for accuracy, as well as make 
additional comments on his or her statements to deepen further the case record.   
 Interviews were scheduled during the first meeting with the fire company, but 
were not be conducted until the second or later visit.  By conducting the interviews on a 
second or later visit, the researcher was somewhat known to the group and was able to 
elicit richer information from the participants.  The time, duration, and location of 
interviews was recorded. 
Interviewees were assigned a pseudonym known only to the researcher.  They 
were identified as a firefighter or an officer, and the department the individual is from 
was not be identified.  The pseudonym log was maintained with the consent forms. 
Ending Data Collection 
 Collection of data in a study such as this can go on almost indefinitely.  The 
researcher could always find another question to ask, another interview to conduct, or 
another item to triangulate for inclusion.  The decision to end data collection considered 
having sufficient data to triangulate key coding categories, MOI, and data repetition in 
general.  Data collection continued in this study until data began to be overextended- the 
additional information gleaned from subjects did not extend the categories, MOI, or study 
in general. 
Data Triangulation 
  Triangulation refers to verifying information from multiple sources.  Member 
checking involved having interviewees check quotations in transcripts of interviews for 
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accuracy.  Triangulation also played a role in the confirmability by ensuring that critical 
information has been verified by more than one source.  According to Stake, the need for 
triangulation is related to the type and use of the data.  Data that is trivial or beyond 
question, or is an interpretation made by the researcher, has little need for triangulation.  
A description that is relevant and debatable, a moderate need for triangulation exists.  
Lastly, data that are critical to assertions or are controversial require strong triangulation 
(Stake, 2010). 
 Norman Denzin identified four types of triangulation, methods that can be used in 
the situations described above.  These are to use multiple investigators of the same 
phenomenon, use multiple participants to develop a depth of perspectives, use of multiple 
methods (interviews to support observations, historical documents to verify interview 
data), and lastly Theoretical Sampling.  This last concept for triangulation is applied by 
determining if conclusions can be generalized to other time periods or other locations, or 
if conclusions can be applied from groups to individuals within the group, from this 
group to similar groups, and from this group to a larger set of firefighters, for example, an 
entire shift.  Given the particularity of this case study, this last method may be least 
effective and practical.  Emphasis was placed on using multiple methods and multiple 
participant interviews to ensure triangulation (1989).  Multiple investigators and 
theoretical sampling were not used. 
Data Management 
The researcher applied two data management strategies recommended by Gall, 
Borg, and Gall (1996).  First, a standard format was used to make field notes as well as 
for making summaries.  Standard forms were used to record specific details about people, 
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events, and situations, and to generate additional questions to be asked of other company 
members during their interviews.  Ideas for presenting the collected information were 
captured on the standard forms so that the researcher could start to structure the case as it 
presented itself. 
A system of coding, organizing, and retrieving the data was utilized.  Multiple 
back-ups of electronic files and copies of notes and hard copies were made to minimize 
the potential for data loss.  These copies were stored in more than one location.  Audio 
recordings were made with a high-quality digital recorder.  A master list of data types 
was used.   
Data Analysis 
Data analysis was interwoven with the collection process, as the meanings and 
relationships that are uncovered led to a better understanding of the case.   
A general strategy was used to analyze more formally the data following all data 
collection.  First, all data was reviewed, with notes being made as to how the data fits into 
a description of the case.  Next, themes were established to begin to reduce the raw data 
to a more manageable form.  Areas of change were identified during interviews, and later 
member-checked to ensure an exhaustive list.  Third, the data was described, classified, 
and interpreted using categorical systems that emerge from deduced meanings of the 
material.   
 The first stage of analysis utilized a classification system, coding, and thematic 
categorization.  The second stage of analysis drew connections within and between the 
themes leading to analysis and interpretation. In the first stage, data was member-checked 
and/or triangulated to ensure data fidelity.  This led to the development of major topics 
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within the first two research questions.  These topics were grouped together into broader 
categories which became the groupings for analysis in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 4 was written as a realist tale (Van Maanen, 2011) with experiential 
authority from both the theoretical model used and the researcher’s depth of experience 
in the field along with his training and education as a researcher.  The fieldwork was tied 
to a particular problem, providing the researcher with insider access that Van Maanen 
identifies as crucial to fieldwork (2011). 
A fragmentation approach was used to preserve the variety of viewpoints.  
According to Gagliardi, using this framework helps to codify, organize, and share 
cultural research (Martin, 2002).  Fragmentation allowed multiple meanings, multiple 
views, and the presence of disagreement and ambiguity to come through in the narrative 
and analysis (2002). 
Participants 
 The participants for this case study were selected by the researcher based on the 
length of time they have been a member of the department, how engaged they are with 
department activities in 2015, how engaged they were in 2010 before the LODD event, 
and with input from the chief of the department.  A selection of persons on the 
department before and after the Line of Duty Death was sought to ensure an accurate 
picture of the organizational culture before and after the death.  Additionally, persons 
familiar with the department’s changes in the prescribed period were interviewed to aid 
in the triangulation of data from within the department. 
 Prior to beginning the study, reports of the incident and the organizational 
structure of the fire department was reviewed.  All full-time members on the department 
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consented to being interviewed, along with a convenience sample of the active part-time 
members of the department.  When a participant suggested that the researcher contact a 
specific additional person to interview, the researcher attempted to contact the individual.  
These additional interviews of persons outside the department provided triangulation of 
the collected data, provided an outside perspective on what the changes meant, and 
helped add depth to the fragmented story of how change happened.   
 When other information that helped capture the story of the fire department being 
studied or would help the researcher understand the case, that information was also 
considered.  These became vignettes that helped tell the story, including a similar LODD 
that occurred 15 miles away and 15 years earlier and the specific events that happened on 
the day of the LODD. 
Researcher Background 
 Since this study focuses on a fire department, it is helpful for the reader to 
understand the researcher’s background regarding the fire service.  At the time of the data 
collection, the researcher was employed by the state’s statutory fire academy and had 
worked there for 15 years delivering training and education for emergency responders, 
developing curriculum based on needs from the field as well as from national standards, 
and conducting research within the fire service.  He entered the fire and emergency 
services in 1990, and has experience as a firefighter and fire officer on a volunteer 
department, and had colleagues, students, and peers in the geographic area of the studied 
department that allows him better access than a pure civilian researcher would have.   
 The researcher’s experience in the fire and emergency services allowed for a 
native’s point of view of the case while allowing objectivity and balance from his training 
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as a researcher (Van Maanen, 2011).  The researcher ensured objectivity during the study, 
and focused on the research topic more than a general interest in the organization.  He 
also ensured that he was not seen as an agent of the state fire academy conducting an 
investigation, but seen as a researcher conducting a study. 
Human Subject Protection 
In all research, actions must be taken to protect the participants, as well as other 
aspects of the case.  For this study, the following measures were taken to protect human 
subjects: 
1. The researcher had completed all required training programs for human subject 
protection for research at the University of Illinois. 
2. The University Of Illinois Bureau Of Educational Research had approved the 
research project before starting. 
3. Two experienced case study researchers reviewed the project and oversaw a pilot 
study at a different location. 
4. A dissertation advisor and committee were guiding the researcher.   
5. Participants were informed both verbally and in writing about the purpose and 
procedures of the research.  This included a description of what was asked and 
expected of each participant. 
6. Participants signed an informed consent form demonstrating their understanding 
of the study’s goals and methods, as well as their willingness to participate in the 
study.   
7. Participants were able to terminate their participation at any time. 
8. Participants were notified when audio recordings were made. 
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9. Transcripts were provided to each participant for him or her to correct the 
transcript, and clarify their statements before the use of controversial quotations.   
Chapter 3 Summary 
This chapter contained an overview of qualitative research about this study and an 
introduction to case study methodology.  The rationale for case selection was discussed, 
along with the concepts of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability 
described instead of validity and reliability.  Methods of data triangulation, collection, 
management, and analysis were all discussed.  Participant selection was shared, the 
researcher’s background as it pertains to this case was revealed, and methods of 
protecting human subjects was discussed.   
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Chapter 4: Research Setting 
This chapter provides a history of the community of Du Quoin; an overview of 
the Du Quoin Fire Department; the family ties that bind members to the DQFD; the 
connection between the DQFD and a program at the state fire academy; a fatal fire in 
Hurst, Illinois that is very similar event to the June 2011 fatality on the DQFD; a 
leadership change at the DQFD; and the fireground death of a DQFD member that 
occurred in June 2011.   
Three particular events which impacted and shaped the change are included in this 
section to identify the origin of some of the changes that were revealed in the study.  The 
first episode, “Smoke Divers,” taps into the historical aggressiveness of the fire 
department, an origin story of sorts for the values and assumptions of the department 
related to their fire suppression methods in 2010.   The second episode describes a 
fireground LODD from Hurst, Illinois.  The death of Kevin Reveal at this fire is a nearly 
identical LODD that occurred 15 years earlier and 15 miles away from the Du Quoin 
LODD.  The Du Quoin Fire Department chief who was promoted in April 2010 was at 
this fatal fire, and his experiences at the Hurst LODD fire helped shape his overall 
command philosophy as the organizational leader and also drove his decisions at the 
incident where Du Quoin LODD occurred in 2011.  The final episode captures the 
promotion of the department’s training officer to Chief of Department in April 2010.   
The inclusion of these historical anecdotes is supported by Schein in his statement 
“If we want to analyze organizational cultures we should reconstruct their histories and 




When the study was selected the researcher was not aware that the promotion and 
leadership changed had occurred in 2010; the period was selected to give a point of 
reference to ask about the department before the LODD.  Ruling a leadership change in 
or out was not part of the case selection criteria.  It was revealed through the interview 
process that many of the changes that were originally attributed to the 2011 LODD were 
more directly correlated with this leadership change.  
The City of Du Quoin 
The city of Du Quoin was settled in 1803 by the Kaskaskia Tribe and named for 
the chief of the tribe, Jean Baptiste Du Quoin.  The son of a Frenchman and a Tamaroa 
Indian (sic) woman, Du Quoin staked out property in the area currently known as Old Du 
Quoin, an area of seasonal Native American hunting camps.  Growth in the area was 
accelerated and the original settlement moved west with the opening of a rail line that 
extended from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico in 1840.  The city was officially 
commissioned on September 20, 1853.   
Strip mining was common in the area, and in the 1920s, William R. Hayes 
reclaimed the land that is now home to the Du Quoin State Fair.  The fair was held the 
week preceding Labor Day beginning in 1923.  Hayes had a vision of creating the 
experience he’d had at the 1904 World’s Fair in St. Louis in the community of Du Quoin, 
located 90 miles to the southeast of St. Louis (Mathis, 2002) in Perry County, Illinois.  
He named the event the Du Quoin State Fair to garner the same class and respect as the 
official State Fair, held a week earlier in the state capital of Springfield.  The initial fair 
had harness racing as a cornerstone, along with automobile racing, car and dog shows, a 
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speech by the governor, a flying circus with parachutists, and a “dirigible from Scott Air 
Force base as the grand finale” (Illinois Department of Agriculture). 
Hayes constructed an opera house in Du Quoin, along with a chain of movie 
theaters and a Coca-Cola franchise.  He located the local Coca-Cola bottling plant on the 
land adjacent to the fairgrounds and indulged his love of harness racing by creating a 
track that hosted the Hambletonian race starting in 1957, where it ran for 24 years.  
One of the current officers on the DQFD is a grandson of William Hayes.  He 
shared that the Hayes family has strong connections to resources, being able to acquired 
tons of metal to build the fair grandstands during World War II at a time when most 
construction resources were being diverted to building equipment for the military.   
 The Hambletonian ran on Du Quoin’s “Magic Mile” clay track until it relocated 
to the New Jersey Meadowlands in 1976.  It was quickly replaced at the Du Quoin 
Fairgrounds by the World Trotting Derby.   
The Du Quoin State Fair was operated during World War II when the Illinois 
State Fair was shut down for wartime use.  In 1986, the State of Illinois assumed 
management of the Du Quoin State Fairgrounds, and the tradition of having a second 
state fair continues to this day.  The Du Quoin State Fair draws more than a quarter 
million people to the area for the 10-day event and remains the largest spectator event in 
southern Illinois. 
The Du Quoin state fairgrounds is an economic driver for the community, and the 
size of the fire department is a byproduct of the frequent use of the grounds for racing, 
monthly flea markets, fireworks, and the annual Holiday Lights Fair.  Officer 7 added 
that the population of the town could increase by thirty to forty thousand people 
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depending on what event was at the fairgrounds on a given weekend.  He views the 
visitors as being in the community, and as being part of the DQFD’s responsibility. 
A different view of the community comes from an officer who describes the town 
as having “old buildings, poorly maintained,” with “70 percent of the families living 
below the poverty line” in “crowded conditions.”  Corroborating this another officer 
describes that the high school used to have 500 students, and now it is down to 300-350 
students.  Three large factories in the area have closed in recent years, leading to more 
families and workers leaving the area.  This has impacted the fire department because the 
buildings are poorly maintained, there are more vacant structures, and there are fewer 
residents to serve as volunteer members of the department. 
The Du Quoin Fire Department 
The DQFD was founded in 1853 as a volunteer fire department.  The first full-
time chief was hired in the late 1950’s. The ranks continued to grow through the mid-
1960s when three full-time staff, each working a shift each third day, were hired. The 
current Fire Chief is the longest-serving contemporary member of the department.  He 
was hired in 1983 to fill a newly-created full-time position labeled, the “7th man,” which 
allowed the chief to work days. Two firefighters were on shift each day, and the chief 
moved from a shift (working every third day) to working Monday through Friday.  
The current fire chief responded and assisted at his first structure fire wearing his 
station uniform because his firefighting gear had not arrived yet. At the time, the fire 
department living quarters were located in the former tack storage area, suspended 
between the apparatus bay on the ground floor and the city council meeting space on the 
top floor. There was one door in and out of the living area.  The walls were knotty pine 
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paneling, and in 1983 and everyone on the department smoked cigarettes and did so 
inside of the station.  In 2015, no one on the full-time staff is a smoker.  
The main fire station was erected in 1988 and sits at the intersection of a state 
route and a business-lined street one block off of the main street in Du Quoin. The station 
sits on a corner lot, and the apparatus bays empty out onto State Route 51,  a meandering 
trail through town. A door for personnel to enter on the side of the building adjacent to 
the bay doors.  Between the bay doors sit concrete Dalmatians and a flagpole, flying the 
largest American flag in town.  The bay doors are often open in pleasant weather, 
signaling the firefighters are working in the bay.  There is no marking on the front of the 
building identifying it as the fire department.   
To the immediate west is the Redenour Overpass, a bridge built in 1995 over the 
railroad tracks.  Before this bridge, there was a second fire station on the opposite (west) 
side of the tracks.  The bridge was erected through the work of former Mayor John 
Redenour who served on many local boards and was the chair of the state Democratic 
Party.  Officer 3 recalled seeing photographs of Redenour with three sitting presidents in 
Redenour’s office.   
After construction of the bridge, the second fire station was moved to the growing 
southern edge of the community, closer to the fairgrounds. It sits roughly two miles south 
of the main fire station, along the same state route and adjacent to the Du Quoin State 
Fairgrounds. The building formerly housed a utility company, but now is used by the fire 
department and other public safety agencies.  However, most of the building is unused; 
the fire department only utilizes the indoor parking area and bathrooms. 
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In the main station, artifacts and décor remind the employees and volunteers of 
the DQFD’s (sometimes difficult) history. When the researcher shared the overview of 
the study, one firefighter laughingly shared that the department held onto rotary phones 
as long as possible. Shelves contain albums with photographs and news clippings dating 
back to the 1960s. A diner-style menu board with individual plastic letters lists current, 
past, deceased, and the one LODD member.  Additionally, there is a 3’ x 4’ black and 
white poster of a photograph of the LODD firefighter, his helmet slightly askew and an 
uneven smile.  Sheets of blueprints and building plans are unrolled on the bar in the 
kitchen- a new addition to the station, a byproduct of building inspections.  The 
kitchen/living room area is centrally located within the station, and firefighters can access 
the sleeping quarters and bathrooms, apparatus bay, and offices each from a different 
doorway.   
While a rigid hierarchy exists on the emergency scene, the feel around the station 
is more collegial.  When the fire chief makes a trip to the store, he often asks what the on-
duty crew might need before going.  Even within this informality, there is still evidence 
of the rank structure.  When the chief is out of the building, the junior firefighter answers 
the phone and door without being told to by the senior man. There is no overt 
communication or gesture between the two FF that indicates who should answer the door 
or phone; it is an understood organizational-cultural norm.  
Emergency calls used to be managed directly through the fire department but are 
now routed through an emergency call and dispatch center in Du Quoin.  There was much 
angst with this change, including concern from the FD members that their response times 
would be increased and their level of service diminished. 
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EMS is now provided from the nearby town of Pinckneyville, with an ambulance 
staged in Du Quoin.  The FD operated an ambulance until it was decertified by the state 
in the late 1980s.  There was great concern about no longer providing this service, but the 
increasing demands of licensure were more than the department could manage. 
Regardless of these reductions, the DQFD continues to provide services to 11,000 
residents (NIOSH, 2011) in over 85 square miles, with 6,500 residents in the urban center 
of the city limits of Du Quoin.  While comparable communities in the area typically 
employ three full-time firefighters, the businesses and industry that grew in support of the 
Fairgrounds and along the railroad led to a larger fire department for Du Quoin.  
Presently, the DQFD employs seven full-time firefighters who are supported by a handful 
of volunteers. Departments such as the DFQD with paid and volunteer members are 
commonly referred to as ‘combination fire departments.’ The study department is the 
only paid fire department in Perry County, Illinois.  The closest career departments of 
similar size have 5 and four full-time members. There have been several historical 
attempts, via referenda, to convert the department to fully volunteer to staff but each 
ballot has shown the public’s support for the fire department’s current organization.  The 
career members of the department are not unionized, which is uncommon for the area.  
Family Ties 
The fire department self-describes as a family.  “The guys are from here, and their 
families are here.”  One officer was close with an uncle who was a Marine and 
firefighter.  This led him into both the USMC and the fire service.  His son had 
firefighting “in his blood and joined the department as soon as he was old enough.  He 
was doing something he enjoyed doing, and he was protecting his community.”  One FF 
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shared memories of coming to visit his father at the department, going to the Christmas 
parties, and watching his dad go on emergency responses.  He was drawn to this fire 
department, admired the work they did, and always knew it was something he wanted to 
do if given the opportunity.  His father served on the department for 26 years, retiring in 
2009. 
Another firefighter had a stepfather on the department for 34 years, including time 
as chief.  A third firefighter’s father joined the DQFD in 1983 and retired in 2009.  “I’ve 
been in this department my whole life, and I grew up with everybody and knew 
everybody, they are all considered family to me.” He grew up wanting to be a FF from 
seeing his dad do the job and seeing the camaraderie of the department.  An officer’s 
father was a local volunteer, and he became interested in firefighting in college.  He was 
hired in 1996.   A different full-time member’s father retired from the DQFD as chief.  
He always wanted to be a firefighter and was hired full-time in 2009.  In all, 5 of the 
seven full-time members are second- or third-generation firefighters. 
One firefighter captured the June 2011 LODD as “The loss was especially hard 
because Corey was just like me.  He grew up with the fire department just like me.  It was 
personal.  It was personal for everybody just because they knew him for so many years.”  
“Smoke Divers” 
The first SCBA the department owned came from the local civil defense agency, 
and the chief at the time had a strong military background and supported this new method 
of fire attack.  Two other firefighters who came on near the same time as the new fire 
chief were sent to the University of Illinois Fire Service Institute shortly after each was 
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hired to attend the Advanced Breathing Apparatus Specialist or “Smoke Divers” 
program.    
While core competencies were taught within the department by senior members, 
the Smoke Divers course was the first class that new full-time members were sent to gain 
a more comprehensive understanding of the capabilities and limitations of their Self-
Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA). The program was created in May of 1976, and 
offered biannually at the state fire academy located three hours north (Ehrenhart, 2015). 
The devices were still relatively new to the fire service, and by having in-depth 
knowledge about the equipment the Du Quoin Firefighters were more aggressive than 
neighboring fire departments.  Upon completion of Smoke Divers training, Du Quoin FF 
would go out and help train neighboring departments. 
One officer describes Smoke Divers as “the single best class I have ever taken.”  
He shares a story of responding to a fire in an apartment above a furniture store in a 
neighboring town with a young girl trapped in the apartment.  The ceiling had collapsed, 
and there were wires that entangled the firefighters.  This officer used tools and 
techniques from the Smoke Diver’s course to enter the apartment, make his way to the 
girl’s room, and rescue the girl by cutting their way out of the room. 
A drawback to the Smoke Diver’s program was that it was viewed by this fire 
department as terminal training- the pinnacle of training that a firefighter could receive.  
Firefighters believed that they had received the top tier of training, and many did not seek 
knowledge after that. 
LODD in Hurst, Illinois, 9/29/1996 
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Herrin firefighter Kevin Reveal was killed at a mutual aid structure fire in Hurst 
Illinois on September 29, 1996.  His crew had been operating outside of an older masonry 
building, helping to pull plywood down to uncover window openings so that hose streams 
could be directed inside (IFLODD, 2015).  During this activity a wall collapsed onto him, 
burying him in beneath the bricks.  He was pulled from the rubble, transported to Herrin 
Hospital, and pronounced dead on arrival.   
Officer 1, a Captain on the Herrin Fire Department, was at the fire, and when he 
arrived he meet with the chief of the Hurst Fire Department.  The chief admitted he was 
over his head, and asked Officer #1 to “take control and figure out what we need to do.”  
Officer #1 shared that the attitude his company brought to the fireground was one of 
“there ain’t (sic) a fire we cannot put out.”  One of the other departments heard the wall 
crack and start to fail.  There was a Halligan bar on the ground at the base of the failing 
wall, and Herrin Firefighter Kevin Reveal went to retrieve the tool.  As he leaned over to 
pick up the bar, the wall collapsed onto him. 
Officer 3 from the DQFD was a captain at the time and was also at this fire.  He 
recalled standing behind a group of chief officers that night, listening to their discussion 
about the hazards of going inside the building.  By listening to their discussion, they had 
no idea that the structure might collapse.  He had researched it to understand what 
happened.   
Following the loss of Herrin Firefighter Reveal in Hurst, there was a tactical 
change within the Herrin Fire Department.  The new attitude was “it’s just a building.”  
The department began to pay more attention to keeping track of members at larger 
incidents and sent department members to learn more about rescuing firefighters in 
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classes at IFSI.  They expanded the size of collapse zones around buildings and looked at 
“death trap” buildings in their community more closely.  They also started the “clock” of 
fire damage from when the fire started or when they were notified, not when they were 
dispatched.  In the case of this fire, the fire department was on scene for 40 minutes 
before calling Herrin for help, and it took 10 minutes for them to travel to the fire.   
Leadership Change at the DuQuoin Fire Department 
Returning to the DuQuoin Fire Department, Officer 3 was promoted to Fire Chief 
in April of 2010.  He was a fixture of the community, and when we went to lunch during 
an interview it seemed that everyone in the restaurant and on the walk there knew him 
and greeted him by name.  To them, he was both the Fire Chief and the town’s football 
coach. 
 The outgoing fire chief oriented the incoming chief simply, giving him a set of 
keys to the building and sharing which filing cabinet contained financial paperwork and 
which contained personnel and training information.  The outgoing chief assured him 
“You’ll do great!” as he left the office.  Officer 3 was also admonished that “This is 
Mayberry- don’t screw that up!” This instruction ran contrary to the new chief’s desire to 
develop leaders at every level in the department, to modernize the department, and for the 
department to be successful and sustainable into the future. 
He took the job with conditions.  He wanted a larger budget for training and 
requested an increase from $2,500.00 (which was typically spent on operational needs 
instead of training) to $15,000.00.  The city council approved $5,000.  He developed a 
five-year improvement plan for the fire department and educated the city administration 
on which state and national standards were not being met by the department. His vision 
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was based on articles he’d read in firefighting trade magazines and from classes he’d 
attended the University of Illinois Fire Service Institute. 
When promoted he had a vision of what he wanted to “fix” in the department.  He 
knew that the department needed better training and education and that he would need to 
break through the attitude that “we’re too good of a department” to need to change. 
From the outset, he felt that he was “going to be an unpopular chief” because of 
the changes he anticipated making to the department.  After his appointment to Fire 
Chief, he established the rank and position of Captain on the Du Quoin FD.  He 
implemented building inspections.  He implemented requirements tied back to state and 
national certification that had to be met before being promoted to Chief or Captain.  The 
Assistant Fire Chief was sent to classes to complete his initial fire officer certification and 
quickly was sent out for classes to complete the second level of certification. 
“I want leaders” was how the new fire chief described his leadership vision for the 
department.  “I knew that we could not continue with the way we had been doing things.  
We needed to train and needed to grow and learn.” 
 Accountability systems provide a means of keeping track of emergency 
responders and tasks during emergencies.  The previous fire chief had refused to 
implement an accountability system for tracking firefighters at emergency scenes.  He 
was quoted as having said, “as long as I’m here, we won’t have an accountability 
system.”  Because the department had the only ladder truck in the area and was 
frequently called for mutual aid to other communities, implementing a system for 
tracking personnel was a high priority for the new fire chief.   
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He characterized previous chief officers as men that “did the best they could with 
what they knew how to do.” They weren’t aware of some of the dangers that lurked in 
burning buildings or the additional dangers created through the act of extinguishing fires.   
The new chief was appointed in April of 2010.  In May of 2010, he and his 
assistant chief attended a course entitled “Fire Officer of the 21st Century” at a local 
community college put on by the Illinois Fire Chief’s Association.  This session helped to 
reinforce the vision the chief had for where the DQFD could be, and provided a network 
and resources to leverage for the desired changes. 
The chief has been in office since April of 2010, working out of a physical office 
which is sparse and unassuming.  His desk is a six-foot folding table, with the 
March/April 2010 calendar still tacked to the wall above it more than five years later.  
Memorandum and notices are attached to the wall with tacks or tape.  The desk faces one 
wall, and each of the other three walls contain framed quotes that the chief attributes his 
success to.  He shares that one of the three quotes gets him through each leadership 
decision he needs to make.   The quotes, all in black wooden frames, are: 
“The best executive is the one who has sense enough to pick good men to do what 
he wants done, and the self-restraint to keep from meddling with them while they 
do it.  – Theodore Roosevelt” 
 
“A leader is best when his people barely know he exists, when his work is done, 




“The challenge of leadership is to be strong but not rude; kind, but not weak; be 
bold, but not bully; be thoughtful, but not lazy; be proud, but not arrogant; have 
humor but without folly. – Jim Rohn” 
 
The chief’s two bookcases contain not only the minimum set of books required by 
the insurance rating agency (ISO) but also a variety of recent training and leadership 
texts.  They reinforce his claim to absorb what other fire agencies and fire authors are 
doing and cherry-pick the best and most applicable ideas for his department.  This 
deflection of credit is consistent with most of the time we spent together- the chief makes 
it clear that the department members did the heavy lifting of their organizational change 
up to this point.  His air of humility hides the work he has done to create the vision that 
his firefighters are fulfilling with his guidance.  He deftly deflects credit for the 
department’s successful changes onto his peers, mentors, and most significantly the 
firefighters and officers of the DQFD.  He feels that “It’s got to be OK for people to 
challenge what you’re doing.” 
 “Reality Came to Town” June 17, 2011 
On June 17, 2011, the fire department responded to assist with suppressing a large 
fire in downtown Pinckneyville, roughly 12 miles northwest of Du Quoin.  The fire was 
located in a 96-year-old brick and masonry building which housed an antique store with 
living quarters in the rear.  The fire began towards the back of the structure shortly after a 
thunderstorm, with the Pinckneyville Fire Department was notified of the fire at 1515 
hours.  They called the Du Quoin Fire Department 10 minutes later because Du Quoin 
had the only ladder truck in the county (NIOSH, 2015).  The Du Quoin truck, in use since 
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2001, responded with four firefighters at 1531 and was joined by two other firefighters 
traveling in their personal vehicles.  The truck arrived shortly afterward (NIOSH).   




Officer 3 was the highest ranking and highest-certified firefighter on the scene 
amongst the firefighters, fire officers, and fire chiefs from multiple surrounding 
departments.  He identified the officer in charge of the fire as “a good guy with no formal 
training.” The fire was being fought defensively, meaning that no firefighters would be 
allowed inside, due to the congested interior of the structure, advanced fire, age of the 
building, and because the structure was confirmed to be unoccupied (NIOSH).  Officer 
3’s first actions on the scene were to move firefighters on hand lines farther back from 
the structure and out from an awning in the front because his experience at the Hurst fire 
in 1996 and his training led him to believe that a collapse was likely.  He then collected 
the accountability tags from his department’s members and turned his back on the fire 
building to go and record the tags on the board used to track members in his vehicle.   
Following their arrival, the Du Quoin crew set up the ladder truck to extinguish 
the fire from above. The fire grew after the opening of a rear roll-up door on the structure 
and further intensified as a second-story window was uncovered by a firefighter on a 
ladder.  After opening the second-story window, the firefighter left the ladder in place on 
the side of the building. The operator of the ladder truck remarked to a chief officer that 
“your ladder’s gonna (sic) burn up.”  Two firefighters overhead the comment, and took 








At 1554 hours, one Du Quoin and one Pinckneyville firefighter were removing 
that ladder which was leaning against the side of the building.  The Du Quoin firefighter 
had his back to the building and stood between the building and the ladder, and the 
Pinckneyville firefighter stood on the far side.  While the firefighters had the ladder 
vertical and off of the building and were preparing to lower the top section, part of the 
wall that the ladder had been leaning against collapsed.  Officer 3 had his back to the 
building and heard the collapse.  “Someone yelled that the wall was coming down.  
Bricks and falling debris struck the [Du Quoin firefighter] from behind…[The 
Pinckneyville] firefighter ran perpendicular to the collapsing wall, while the [Du Quoin 
firefighter] ran parallel to the wall, towards the front of the building.  The Du Quoin 
firefighter was knocked down and partially buried by the falling debris” (NIOSH, 2015, 
p. 16).  Officer 3 turned around and saw many firefighters scurrying towards the rubble.  
When he saw the black firefighting gear, he knew that the buried firefighter was one of 
two people, both were from his department, and one was his son. When he “saw the big 
blue eyes” of his other firefighter digging through the rubble, he was certain that the 
trapped firefighter was his son. 
The injured Du Quoin firefighter was removed from the rubble and transported to 
the local hospital at 1602 hours and was transferred by helicopter to a trauma center in St. 
Louis where he died soon after.  He was the department’s first fatality since it was 
founded in 1863.  An eyewitness from a neighboring business recounted that she “heard 
the wall collapse.  And then we heard a firefighter yell that they needed a stretcher.  I 
seen (sic) them take him out, you never know though how bad it is” (KFVS, 6/20/2011).   
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The Du Quoin Firefighter that was killed was one month away from completing 
his probation with the department, and this was his second structure fire.  He was the 42nd 
Line of Duty Death reported to the USFA in 2011 (USFA). 
He “died a predictable death, and predictable means preventable.”  One year later, 
the local newspaper The Southern Illinoisan described Officer #3 as being “on an 
absolute mission to make sure firefighters received the training they need.” (Stewart, 
2012).  He was specifically working with the state fire academy to bring more training 
opportunities to Southern Illinois because funds to travel outside of the area for training 
were often unavailable.  He also collaborated with a local firefighter’s organization, the 
local community college, and the statewide mutual aid network to increase the 
availability of training. 
The incident commander from the Hurst LODD shared that “ ‘It can’t happen 
here’ has now happened here twice.”  
According to the NIOSH investigation, “The state of Illinois does not have any 
mandatory state training requirements for volunteer firefighters or fire officers” (NIOSH, 
2011).  Officer 3 found that in situations such as this where no training is required, 26 
percent of departments participate in training.  When training is mandated, that rises to 68 
percent (Stewart, 2012).  Implementing national standards for training was a 
recommendation of the fatality investigation (NIOSH, 2011), and while efforts have been 
made locally to improve training, there remains no statewide requirement for training or 
certification. 
A DQFD officer described the feeling as “in 2011 we had a table set and 
somebody literally yanked the cloth off of it with everything and said start all over again, 
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everything you’ve done is wrong and so you have to start over.”  He continued that  “We 
haven’t found our identity [again] yet… we’re doing so many new things and a lot of 
them we did so quickly too, it was like one idea after another after another after another, 
that sometimes the old one hadn’t even taken hold before we were trying to build on top 
of it.”  
Chapter 4 Summary 
 Chapter four provides an overview of the research setting in Du Quoin, Illinois, 
and a deeper look into some historical aspects of the Du Quoin Fire Department.  Three 
salient episodes that influenced the culture that arose from interviews and other data 
collection methods were included, as well as the LODD that was perceived as the central 
cause for the change in this case.  
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Chapter 5: Findings 
This findings chapter provides the changes to the department’s organizational 
culture grouped by the categories which emerged from the process of coding the Modes 
of Implementation (MOI).  Analysis for each MOI grouping opens each section, with 
supporting evidence from the data obtained in the study.  This evidence draws a contrast 
between Research Question 1: What were the MOI of the DQFD in 2010, and Research 
Question 2: What were the MOI of the DQFD in 2015?  Gagliardi’s model is analyzed to 
see if cultural incrementalism can explain the change that occurred.  The chapter closes 
with a summary. 
The researcher and the research project were introduced to the department at a 
regularly scheduled monthly meeting.  The researcher then scheduled observations, 
document reviews, and later interviews to allow the researcher to build a rapport with the 
firefighters and officers before conducting interviews.  This approach seems to have 
worked, as during observations and later visits the firefighters spoke conversationally 
with each other, using nicknames, slang, and coarse and colorful language in the presence 
of the interviewer, indicating a degree of comfort. 
One interviewee described this research project as their first opportunity to talk 
about the changes that they had been experiencing.  While there had been ample 
opportunity for progressing through stages of grief and recovery from the LODD, they 
did not appreciate the volume and magnitude of changes to their culture until the 




RQ 1: What were the Modes of Implementation of the organizational culture of the fire 
department in 2010?  
RQ 2: What were the Modes of Implementation of the organizational culture of the fire 
department in 2015?  
RQ 3: Did the organizational culture of the department change from 2010 to 2015?  
Coding Schema 
The Modes of Implementation (MOI) of the department were considered in two 
broad slices of time, aligned with Research Question 1 (MOI in 2010) and Research 
Question 2 (MOI in 2015).  MOI are the “perceivable forms of behavior and operations,” 
observable expressions of the organizational culture (Gagliardi, 1986, p. 125).  Since the 
goal of the study was to compare two points in time and determine if a change occurred, a 
focus on the MOI provided more objective results for comparison and analysis. 
Following each observation period, interview, or document review, a tool was 
used to identify the MOI that emerged from each data source.  A master list of MOIs was 
created, and member-checked by the interviewees.  The list of MOI that emerged is used 
to identify points of comparison between the two time periods, broken down by the two 
time periods in the research questions below.  While some MOIs were present in 2015 
and not in 2010, there were no MOIs that were present in 2010 but not in 2015.  If an 
MOI is not listed in Research Question 1 (2010) but appeared in Research Question 2 
(2015), it indicated that the mode was not brought up during interviews.  
Once the full list of MOIs had been member checked, the 27 MOIs were grouped 
into eight categories.  As analysis progressed, this was reduced to 6 overarching 
categories.  These categories and modes are listed in Chart 3. 
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Table 5.1: Modes of Implementation 
Typical Day at the Department  
General Comments 
Correlation to Kunadharaju et al. (2011) 
Member Requirements & onboarding (6 
MOI) 
- Career O Qualifications 
- Career FF Qualifications 
- POC O Qualifications  
- POC FF  Qualifications 
- POC Participation  











Responses (4 MOI) 
- Accountability System  
- Fire Responses 
- Volunteer Responses 
- Medical Responses 
 
 




External (5 MOI) 
- Compartment Standardization 
- Interagency Partnerships 
- Automatic Aid 






Incident Command- SOPs 
Incident Command- SOPs 
Equipment- Availability; 
Operations/Tactics- Communications & 
Personnel- Training 




- Fire Prevention/ Public Education 
- Equipment 




Incident Command- Risk Assessment 
Incident Command- Risk Assessment 
Incident Command- SOPs 




Training (4 MOI) 
- Driver Training/Familiarization 
- Company/Shift Training 
- Departmental Training 











Following the creation of categories, two methods were used to validate the 
chosen breakdown.  First, the 27 MOIs were provided to 3 experienced fire officers and 
they were asked to group the MOIs into categories.  Their grouping correlated with the 
researcher’s categories 75% of the time.  Second, the MOIs were considered against the 
Fishbone diagram of firefighter fatalities (Kunadharaju et al., 2011, p. 1177).  All but one 
of the MOIs listed could be correlated against at least one of the root causes that 
Kunadharaju listed, indicating that all of the categories had been identified as a 
contributing factor in firefighter fatalities.  By making changes in these areas, the DQFD 
made changes that could have a positive impact on firefighter safety and injury 
prevention. 
General Information 
In 2010, the Du Quoin FD “guys knew we needed to change, knew we were way 
behind” what other fire departments in the state and US were doing.  Change was 
happening at the Du Quoin Fire Department before the LODD occurred, but it was 
happening very slowly. 
The department had an awareness that the “good ole (sic) boy’s ways” wasn’t the 
way forward for the department.  They knew that they lacked preplanning, training, and 
building inspections, especially for unsafe and vacant structures.  Staging at emergency 
scenes was ad hoc, and an accountability system was not in use.  There was “a decent 
grasp of tactics,” and the department had an understanding of the OSHA “two in/two out” 
rule, but it “wasn’t routinely followed because enough manpower wasn’t always 
available.”  They were an “aggressive, interior firefighting department.”  
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Category 1: A Typical Day at the DQFD 
Analysis.  This fire department averages two emergency calls every three days, 
and in 2015, their time between calls (termed “excess capacity” in fire service parlance) 
was much more constructively utilized than in 2010.   
Supporting Data.  When asked to describe a typical day on the department in 
2010, the respondents described a “more laid-back time.”  They came to work, had a brief 
discussion with the off-going firefighters which was usually over coffee, checked the 
apparatus, and waited for a call to come in.  Training occurred, but it was monthly and 
isolated.  One officer described the milieu regarding change as “It wasn’t necessarily 
frowned upon to change things, but it certainly wasn’t encouraged openly.”  There were 
informal conversations about what needed to change compared to other fire departments, 
but no momentum to make that change happen. 
A typical day in 2015 started with a brief discussion between the off-going and 
on-coming crews.  They pass on any relevant information that happened on the last shift 
and share any items that need to be completed on the new shift in addition to regular 
activities.  Next, the fire apparatus are checked for readiness; then housework is 
completed.  The fire chief typically answers the phone and greets visitors and residents 
while the on-duty crew is getting their work done.   
Once the general work is complete, the crew has responsibilities in their 
individual areas of responsibility.  The crews are now involved in work and projects often 
lasting until after dinner time, whereas they used to be done with side work for the day in 
the early afternoon.  Training (discussed in more detail later) now has a ubiquitous and 
permanent presence in the work day. 
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One officer thought about the question of “what is a typical day like?” and 
responded that the department is still in flux- “There isn’t a ‘new’ typical day yet.  There 
used to be maddening periods of down time and now there’s a lot more scheduled 
activity.” Another member described the current workload as “It seems like now we’re 
always constantly doing something.”  A third officer characterized the average day as 
“When stuff popped up in the old days it was no big deal because we had time to take 
care of it.  Now, we’re on the go all the time.” 
An interviewee shared that “There’s always something on the burner like a project.  
Evening time is pretty laid back, but I’ll see guys that are still working on something 
from earlier in the day.”  He shared that this is a new phenomenon- “In 2010, the 
workday ended when chores and truck checks were done.”  Specifically, in 2015 
“Everyone is busy with grant funding and writing grants and managing those grants, and 
everyone in the department has been successful in obtaining a grant” which requires the 
workday sometimes to extend past dinner into the evening. 
The new busier days were described in contrast to 2010, when “the department used 
to be more relaxed, with members following fewer rules.  Now, the department follows 
more of their stated policies, for example, all members must be properly licensed to drive 
vehicles, and properly trained to operate them.”  He shared that the new rules and overall 
changes were not bad, but different.   
An officer described the feeling on “as typical day as we could have in the summer of  
2011” as “we had a table set and then somebody literally yanked the cloth off it with 
everything and said start all over again, everything you’ve done is wrong, and so you 
have to start over.”  He elaborated “We haven’t found our identity [again] yet… we’re 
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doing so many new things and a lot of them we did so quickly too, it was like one idea 
after another after another after another, that sometimes the old one hadn’t even taken 
hold before we were trying to build on top of it.”  
Category 2: Member Requirements and Onboarding (6 MOI) 
Analysis.  In 2010, the department had practices in place for onboarding new 
members, but they were incomplete and irregularly followed.  In 2015, there were 
extensive onboarding requirements for all members, strong promotional requirements, 
and a renewed emphasis on providing training to new members while developing existing 
members.  The six MOI categories that were noteworthy are qualifications for career 
officers, career FF, POC officers, POC FF, participation requirements for POC members, 
and a well-defined process for onboarding new volunteer and career FF. 
Supporting Data. In 1983 Officer 3 asked the chief “When will I go to school [to 
learn how to be a firefighter]?” and the chief replied “OJT,” or On-The-Job Training, 
indicating that the new firefighter would learn all that he needed to know experientially 
over time.  When this officer sought feedback on his performance, he asked “How’m I 
doing?” which was met with “Is anyone on your ass?” from the previous chief.  When he 
answered “No,” the previous chief replied with “Then you’re doing OK.” His 
performance was evaluated by conforming to norms more than evaluating his skills and 
abilities related to desired job performance. 
There is a connection between some small career departments in southern Illinois 
and the Advanced Breathing Apparatus Specialist or “Smoke Divers” program at the 
University of Illinois Fire Service Institute.  This week-long class was utilized by these 
departments to normalize the various initial training that firefighters had received before 
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being hired on their current department, and also to ensure familiarity and efficiency with 
the Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus, or SCBA.  A description of the Smoke Diver’s 
program and its connection to the DQFD can be found in Chapter 4. 
In 2010 volunteer members attended a 24-hour non-state-certification Illinois Fire 
College Course called “Basic Recruit Training” for their minimum training, with a goal 
of attaining their state certification “at some point.”  This recruit training course is 
offered once annually over a four-day period three hours north of the department- a 
formula that put the training out of reach for many members.  Other member 
requirements at the time were not enforced, for example, participation requirements for 
POC members.  “We used to keep guys on the roster until they quit, regardless of 
whether or not they were active,” shared one member.  “Now, if you’re not showing up 
and participating regularly, guys kind of select themselves out.” 
In 2015, a member had to be certified at the basic level of state certification to 
take scheduled shifts at the FD, with a pay rate of $11 per hour.  This was raised from 
$8.25 in 2014. Persons with advanced FF training are compensated at $12.50 per hour, 
and those who are certified as fire officers are paid $15.50 per hour. Since state 
certification is optional in Illinois, it is left up to the individual fire departments to 
establish these member requirements.   
An officer position for volunteers, a lieutenant, was added in March of 2014.  
Volunteers seeking this position must meet the state fire officer qualifications first; then 
they can be appointed to lieutenant on the department.  A different officer contradicted 
this statement, identifying the training as encouraged by not required.   
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  In addition to a higher pay rate for responding to emergencies, the department 
now pays for time spent in training and for time invested in Firefighter certification 
classes in addition to responses.  These activities were previously uncompensated. 
 For career members, promotional testing for officer positions began in late 2010.  
Minimum requirements to sit for promotional testing was instituted first for the Chief and 
Assistant Chief positions and later for all promoted positions.  Fire Officer 3 certification 
was required for the Assistant Chief and Chief, and Fire Officer 2 was required for the 
rank of Captain. 
 New members are now sent to the State Fire Academy for an initial training 
course of 7 weeks.   They now exceed all state certification requirements before coming 
off probation as a full-time or career member.   
With the increase in training and improvement in participation due to more 
training opportunities, volunteer members are around more.  This gives them a stronger 
connection to the department’s non-emergency operations.  These volunteers must attend 
75% of training and meetings.   If they do not satisfy this requirement, they receive a 
notice.  Less active volunteers tend to self-select out if they are not attending often 
enough. 
Category 3: Emergency Responses (4 MOI) 
Analysis.  While the DQFD responded to roughly the same number of emergency 
calls in 2015 as they had in 2010 (222 calls in 2015, 227 in 2010), they have significantly 
changed their approach to emergency response and the actions they engage in upon 
arrival and during fire suppression activities.  Notable MOI changes are in the areas of 
how they respond to structure fires philosophically, how volunteer firefighters respond to 
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emergencies, the full implementation of an accountability system, and an improvement in 
how the DQFD responds to medical emergencies. 
Supporting Data.  Officer 3 identified the department as an “aggressive, interior 
attack fire department,” meaning that the actions taken upon arrival at a structure fire 
were to don protective clothing and take a hose line into the burning structure.  “Unless it 
was on the ground, we went in.”  He and other interviewees trace this Mode of 
Implementation back to the first common class that all newly-hired full-time members 
participated in- the Advanced Breathing Apparatus Training, known commonly as 
“Smoke Divers.” This aggressive style led to committing firefighters to burning 
structures without an adequate size-up, and without an exterior firefighter rescue team.  
Emphasis used to be on “run and gun,” on being quick to get water on the fire without 
considering all of the variables related to safety.  “It was chaotic, but we thought we were 
doing a good job.” 
Full-time staff each drove an apparatus to the scene, and volunteers met the 
apparatus at the scene. When subsequent members arrived at the scene, they looked for 
other members that were working and found some way to help.  “You arrived on scene 
and looked for something to do,” is how one firefighter described the ad hoc nature of 
assembling teams.  He continued, “We were a very aggressive interior firefighting crew. 
Our ‘business as usual’ was to knock it hard then we’re thinking about water [supply] 
second to our initial attack.”  
The current practice for responding is to have the volunteers respond to the station 
unless their route to the station takes them directly past the emergency scene, enabling 
the department to begin tracking members at the station and continue it at the scene.  
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While some leaders describe this new process of having volunteers responding to the 
station instead of directly to the scene as happening “every time,” others characterize it as 
a change that is still in progress.  There’s a tension here-  one officer shared that while he 
appreciates the need to keep personal vehicles from cluttering up the scene and the need 
for increased accountability, he felt “that has to be balanced with the need to quickly get 
bodies on the scene to get to work.” 
In 2015 “one of the things that is much better is performing and communicating a 
size-up. The fireground is set up more intentionally, and people are assigned to tasks as 
part of an overall strategy by the Incident Commander instead of looking for ways to 
help.”  This increase in developing a plan for fire suppression was described in the 
context of increasing firefighter safety through the comment that the “Pendulum of FF 
Safety has swung to the far right here and around the area.  Now persons respond to the 
station and don’t go directly to the scene in their private vehicles. There’s an emphasis on 
getting the third piece of apparatus staffed and on the scene, instead of getting firefighters 
in their private vehicles to the scene.”  Because all members now have a pager to alert 
them of emergencies in the community, more members are showing up for calls. 
As a component of the incident command system, an accountability system, a 
means for tracking which firefighters were engaged in which tasks, was emerging on the 
department in 2010, being utilized at the scene of the LODD in 2011, and is now in 
consistent usage.  It was one of the first changes initiated in May 2010 when the new 
chief took office.   
The accountability system implementation, going from no system to changing the 
organizational culture to using the system at every emergency was one level of this 
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change, but a deeper commitment to keeping track of each firefighter came through in the 
interviews with the statement “Accountability isn’t simply putting a name or a tag on an 
organizational board or tool.  It’s evident in how firefighters communicate on the scene.  
Tasks on the fireground are assigned from a central position by the Incident Commander 
as units arrive, replacing the formative approach used previously where individual 
firefighters determined their work assignments.”  This was corroborated by four other 
members with the statements “Now we track who is on the scene, and where they are at 
the incident,” and “There’s now a central hub of accountability.”  While the system is 
always engaged at the start of an incident, one member shared that “The department is 
still learning how to maintain accountability on the fireground,” meaning that as an 
incident evolves members may switch partners or assignments, and the change is not 
always reported back to the Incident Commander.   
 Responses to fires are now much more organized after the accountability system 
is implemented.  “Individuals form up as crews and work as a group under the direction 
of an officer who is operating in contact with the incident commander.”  This is enhanced 
through communication because “Everyone on the scene has a portable radio now, and 
radio communications are better structured following [a class delivered at the department 
by IFSI in August of 2011] called Fireground Management for Small Career and 
Volunteer Fire Departments.”  This class was delivered to the DQFD as the department 
was still reeling from the LODD, and early in the change process.  It provides a simple 
system for communicating and prioritizing activities on the fireground and “It laid the 
groundwork for future classes to build upon by creating a command structure, divisions 
of labor, and radio communications discipline.” 
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 A challenge of the increased workload is reflected on by two officers who 
separately shared that it was “Very difficult to be 100% of the command staff and 50% of 
the on-duty staff,” meaning that with two members on duty, they had both be in charge at 
the fire but also work on tasks related to fire suppression.   
Another change came with the “Realization that we shouldn’t measure our guys 
on ‘that guy did four bottles, he’s a real firefighter!’  We are now managing our people 
effectively like ‘you did two bottles, you need to go sit down and you’re done for a long 
time, maybe you’re not coming back [to service at this fire].’ ” Rehabilitation is now an 
integrated part of fireground operations.  “In the past you’d come out, grab a bottle of 
water, maybe not take their coats off, turn around five minutes and go back in.”  Another 
member described the prior practice to determine medical needs on the fireground as 
“The only time you’d see the medics is if you actually needed to go to the hospital.”  
Members are now assessed at regular intervals before returning into the burning structure.   
Another significant are of change on the fire ground was referred to by members 
as “Second line discipline.”  From 1996-2011 it was rare for this department to pull a 
second hose line to reinforce the first, and rare for the department to secure a water 
supply as a part of their initial operations.  Now, “pulling a larger line (2-1/2”) is 
common, and pulling a second line is also more common.” 
Medical Responses are now at the First Responder level, where previously the 
members had no consistent, formal training for responding to medical emergencies.  Now 
they respond along with the ambulance that is stationed in town, and if they arrive before 
the ambulance, they can begin care within their scope of practice. 
Category 4: External Relationships (6 MOI) 
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Analysis.  The department has drastically transformed their relationships with 
neighboring agencies and also improved their fire suppression rating with the Insurance 
Services Office (ISO).  Changes related to other agencies in addition to this ISO change 
relate to interagency partnerships and interagency training, standardizing compartments 
on apparatus across the geographic area, and changes to automatic aid and mutual aid 
response. 
Supporting Data.  ISO provides a numerical rating to fire departments for 
purposes of determining the cost of fire insurance to residents of that department’s 
protection area.  Departments are scored from 1 (best possible fire protection) through 10 
(no recognized fire protection).  There are minor differences in rates amongst ratings 1, 2, 
and 3; likewise, a rating of 4, 5, or 6 is slightly different.  A rating jump from a 4 to a 3 or 
a 7 to a 6 represents a more dramatic improvement in protection and a more dramatic 
decrease in insurance premiums.   
The ISO evaluates departments on three main areas:  Communications, Water 
Supply, and Training.  The former two categories are generally out of the department’s 
control, but the latter category is a target rich environment for improvement.  In 2010, the 
DQFD was ranked as 7.  The department is now ranked as “a solid 4,” meaning that a 
third-party agency recognized significant changes in how the department trains and their 
capabilities to respond to emergencies, lowering fire insurance costs for Du Quoin 
residents.  A discussion of the specific training changes occurs later in this chapter. 
Compartments on fire apparatus are now standardized within the DQFD and also 
with many of their mutual aid departments.  This consistency allows firefighters to be 
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familiar with the layout of equipment on other agency’s apparatus, allowing for easier 
retrieval of tools during emergencies. 
Both the department studied in this case and the neighboring department where 
the fatality occurred “reported that they planned to implement mutual aid training with 
neighboring departments but had done so on a limited basis” before the LODD (NIOSH, 
2011).  In 2015, this intergroup training was “More structured and more prevalent.”  
Recent topics with other agencies include fighting propane tank fires, confined space 
rescue training, and grain bin emergencies.   This training allows DQFD members to 
“both meet and assess members of other departments.  These assessments can influence 
the level of trust between members of different departments at later incidents.”  Training 
is now viewed as a networking experience, not something mandatory that had to be 
endured.   
A specific area of training was in a course from the State Fire Academy on the 
five combat positions of fireground leadership.  This course focused on the 
responsibilities of 5 critical fireground leadership positions- Incident Commander, 
Operations, RIT, Planning, and Safety Officer.  The IC position is filled first, then Ops, 
then RIT, then Plans, then Safety.  The IC carries all positions until there is sufficient 
personnel present to delegate to.  This is incorporated into all training and responses and 
has become a part of the department’s routine actions.  One officer characterized the 
pervasive nature of this thought process as “Even newer members with no command 
responsibilities are aware of the positions, order they are filled, and what the positions 
entail,” even if they aren’t qualified to fill them yet.  This program also led to the 
development of local and regional protocols for responding to downed firefighters.    
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Another area that differs in 2015 from 2010 is in the areas of how the DQFD 
requests help from other fire departments.  There are two different systems- Mutual Aid, 
where a department manually calls for assistance or resources from neighboring agencies, 
and Automatic Aid, where additional resources are sent based upon information received 
at the dispatch center.  A system of planned responses called Box Alarms has been 
created, so that responses are planned in advance, and more assistance and resources can 
be brought to bear faster by the Incident Commander at an emergency.   
When neighboring departments arrive to work with the DQFD, they are now fully 
dressed in their PPE and ready to “go to work.”  The Chief relates that one of the 
neighboring fire departments that stood by at the Du Quoin fire station while the DQFD 
was out on alarms previously requested to be able to come to the scene to standby so that 
they could watch how the department operated and learn from their example.  This 
department used to arrive not fully dressed in PPE, without SCBA, and without tools.  
Now, when they show up they are fully dressed in their gear, wearing SCBA, with tools, 
and ready to go to work.  The Chief summed up this transformation as “They bought in.” 
A neighboring fire chief described that the DQFD LODD “brought other chiefs 
closer to [the Du Quoin Chief],” and it “opened the door for departments to train together 
more.”  The DQFD chief was described by a chief from outside of the department as “the 
center of gravity, creating a slow, generational move towards making quality training a 
priority” in their region in Southern Illinois.  Over the radio, this chief can hear the 
DQFD “calling for mutual aid sooner, and performing a thorough and consistent 
description of the situation when they arrive on the scene.”  This maintenance of the 
change in the department is reinforced by the fire chief continually “preaching the word.”  
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“Thanks to [the Du Quoin Chief] him there are more volunteer fire departments training 
with career departments.”   
Other interviewees asserted that the DQFD and surrounding departments have 
been “so busy changing, they didn’t realize what they’d changed.”  These additional 
changes in the training environment include a new Fire Science Program at the Rend 
Lake Community College, area-wide policies and procedures for responding to 
firefighters in distress (“MAYDAY” events), and the creation of a new response division 
based on geographic proximity instead of political boundaries.   A social group that 
engages in training while preserving firefighting traditions was also formed, providing 
another dimension to the inter-group relationships.   
Category 5: Officer Empowerment (7 MOI) 
Analysis.  The most significant changes to the DQFD’s organizational culture are 
rooted in changes to the responsibilities and empowerment of the full-time officers, the 
full-time firefighters, and the volunteer officers.  Seven MOI were tied back to this 
activity, with an additional 5 relating solely to training in the next section.  The areas of 
responsibility that the full-time staff were empowered to influence are preplanning, 
inspections, investigations, fire prevention & public education, equipment, NFIRS 
reporting, and apparatus maintenance.   
Supporting Data.     Each full-time member now has a secondary duty on the 
department.  These duties are assigned by position on the department, and as individuals 
move up in rank and tenure, they take on a new role.  The Chief’s stated intention is that 
by the time a person has moved into the assistant chief position, “he has been in each of 
the subordinate positions and tasks and is in a more well-rounded position to lead.” 
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As part of this officer development and empowerment, “All full-time staff have 
written and been awarded a grant.” The process of obtaining the grant allows members to 
network with other city employees and to learn to research how to complete grant 
applications.  It also allows the employees to interact with the city council to obtain 
matching funds for the grants, and better understand the process involved in obtaining 
outside funding.  Recent grants total nearly $500,000.00 over the past ten years, with the 
two largest grants ($217,636.00 and $47,239.00) being received in 2013 and 2014 
respectively. 
Preplanning, or studying specific buildings and hazard areas and planning a 
response before an emergency exists, is now done extensively.  More than “75% of 
downtown has been preplanned” as of 2015 when no preplans existed in 2010.  This 
responsibility was just shifted with a retirement of the previous Assistant Chief in the 
spring of 2015.  The increase in preplanning has led to “Greater recognition and 
discussion of hazards in the community.” 
Fire investigations were previously completed by persons without formal training 
or referred to the Office of the State Fire Marshal in 2010.  In 2011, the officer tasked 
with leading the investigation program “Took three weeks of Fire Investigator training 
and began conducting fire investigations as soon as I was certified.” 
The area of equipment inspection and replacement is relatively unchanged from a 
process standpoint, but it was transferred to a new member due to a retirement and 
promotion.   There have been minimal changes to the NFIRS reporting program and the 
practices for testing apparatus and maintenance because the department was and is 
performing adequately in these areas.   
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Prevention and Public Education have recently been assigned to an officer.  One 
of the first events was to purchase glow sticks for all kids participating in trick-or-treating 
in October of 2015.  While no funding existed, the DQFD members “All chipped in 
personal monies to create a fund to buy the [glow sticks].” 
Building inspections are the newest area being developed, but while nascent they 
are very active.  Inspections “Started in 2013 when the city adopted newer building and 
fire codes” combined with an officer attending training in building inspections.  
Inspections did not exist before that. 
Category 6: Training (4 MOI) 
Analysis.  Training activities are now ubiquitous to the routine of being a Du 
Quoin Firefighter.  It occurs during the day in and out of the station, with career and 
volunteer members alike, and now includes programs taught by outside agencies and 
inclusive of other departments in the area.  While the idea of increasing training within 
the department was part of the chief’s original vision, the breadth and scope of the 
training changes warrant a stand-alone category from the other changes that resulted from 
empowering officers. 
Supporting Data.  All full-time firefighters are now sent to the State Fire 
Academy for seven weeks of intensive initial training, even if they are already certified to 
the initial level.  To stress the importance of this training as a rite of passage, All but one 
of the off-duty FF traveled the three hours to Champaign for the new FFs graduation.   
A new weekly training program is the Driver Training/Familiarization program.  
The officer who coordinates this training gives several addressed to each shift.  Members 
then practice response routes, identify water sources, and discuss tactics with the other FF 
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on duty that day.  This MOI has already evolved to where this information was originally 
kept between the two on-duty firefighters, but it is now shared department-wide.  An 
officer shared the importance of this broader sharing by stating that “This has led to more 
practice communicating a size-up of the fireground,” giving the members an opportunity 
to practice and reinforce communication and incident management skills.   
This training that happens at the shift and company level has “Increased across 
the board,” “Is now a daily occurrence, and is “at a higher level” as the department grows 
more comfortable with and sees the benefits of the new training regimen.   
Departmental Training is now “more thorough and consistent.”  It is still held 
monthly, but “attendance is improving over time as more people are buying into the need 
to train.”   According to a local training officer, the previous chief limited “the training 
that was available to the department, even when the training was at no cost to the 
department.” Now the department takes advantage of “as many classes as we can” 
through a variety of venues and presenters.   
Research Question 3: Did the organizational culture of the department change from 
2010 to 2015?  
Analysis.  The organizational culture of the department changed significantly 
from 2010 to 2015.  Originally it was expected that the change was driven by the 2011 
LODD, but as a result of interviews, document reviews, and observations the researcher 
learned that the leadership change to a new fire chief in the middle of 2010 had a defining 
impact.  The LODD impacted the resources that were available and provided motivation 
for the department to change.   
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Two major sources of the changes in this case study- first, changes that were 
initiated by the chief almost immediately upon his promotion to that position in 2011, and 
those that originated as second-order changes once the chief empowered the full-time 
firefighters and officers with new responsibilities.  The initial Chief-initiated changes 
empowered members with new responsibilities.  These members then moved forward on 
developing with their new responsibilities, leading to the second round of major changes.   
Schein and Gagliardi both describe a connection between organizational culture 
and the leaders in that culture (Schein, 2004; Gagliardi, 1986).   In this case, the initial 
changes were instituted by the new fire chief and the secondary changes were created 
through his subordinate leaders in the department.   
Supporting Data.  One officer describes the changed organizational culture as 
“we’re doing driver’s training during the day, we’re doing preplans, we’re doing 
inspections, we’re going out and giving tours and doing this and doing that- we’re doing 
so much more but at the same time we’re doing it with less.”  His comments reflect the 
tension inherent in change as significant as what the DQFD has processed.  This frenetic 
pace was driven by the chief who said that after the LODD he “wouldn’t take no for an 
answer for the changes that I felt needed to happen to this department.”  He maintained a 
rapid cadence of change because in a different fatality he was familiar with, the 
department “lost steam while making necessary changes, and all issues weren’t 
addressed.”  
Along with an uptick in activity, there are more “struggles with communication.”   
This description was provided by a senior officer of the DQFD without hesitation when 
in response to the question “if you were chief for a day, what you change?”  He indicated 
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that the communication is necessary to reinforce the changes, and to keep all three shifts 
abreast of changes made on each shift.  Communication was an area of challenge 
identified by 4 of the internal interviewees.  The issue was described as “organization-
wide, not tied to a particular person.”  Another identified that the “rate of change drives 
the communication challenges,” and a third narrowed the issue down to relaying 
information as biggest weakness, compounded by a frenetic rate of change.  One member 
connected the communication challenges and the rate of change by saying “We’re 
learning and passing on what we’ve learned before we’ve mastered it.”  Compounding 
this hurdle is a lack of stability due to constant change- “Everyone is focused on their 
side responsibility, and it creates knowledge gaps because of limited communication.” 
While issues arise from time to time, a firefighter shared that there is a uniform 
“Focus on going forward, not backward.”    
DQFD Members are now paying attention to research by national agencies such as 
UL and NIST.  They are “seeking to stay abreast of new developments in fire behavior, 
ventilation, exterior fire attack.”  This cutting-edge mentality is evidenced by one 
member’s comment “When you can go to FDIC, the world’s (sic) largest fire expo, and 
you can hear keynote speakers presenting on information you’ve already heard about in 
our small town in Illinois because of contacts our Chief has made and technology that’s 
now available to learn on our own.”  
Another change shared by the members is that the “Chief has created a culture where 
it’s OK to question things off the emergency scene.”  For example at one fire the chief 
failed to set up a Rapid Intervention Team (Firefighter Rescue Team or RIT), and another 
officer asked about it in the station.  The chief thanked the officer for asking, and shared 
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that he had gotten busy and forgot to establish one early into the incident.  Under the 
previous chief, questioning fireground tactics was not acceptable.    
The chief vowed to the members that he “was going to send us home after every call.  
That’s when he started this regimen of not just necessary training, but pretty much state 
mandated training and there was a lot of that we hadn’t been doing.  So he broke out the 
books and figured out exactly what he had to be doing as a department, especially as far 
as training hours and as far as what we needed to be training on and what we didn’t need 
to be training on.  Our Chief has done a really good job of leading us into the right 
direction.” 
Not all members felt that all changes were necessary.  One shared that “Some of the 
change was needed, some of the change was for the sake of change I think…Some of it 
wasn’t a smooth transition…I think we’re still working on it.”  
A specific change in how members relate to one another was commonly expressed.  
One officer described “a cultural change of valuing members more, mentoring more, 
looking out for each other more.”  Another reinforced that sentiment with the comment 
that “We’re looking after our guys better, every hour, every day, every call.”   A third 
shared “We value ourselves more than we ever have.  We didn’t consider ourselves 
disposable items, but now we’re not going to risk a guy for something we really shouldn’t 
be doing” (O#12).  A different member described this new milieu as having “more 
ownership” but “now we know better, but still lack some of the resources we need.”  
A unique response offered by a member when asked what was different was “It 
would be easier to tell you the things we’re doing the same than to tell you what we’re 
doing differently.  We knew that we needed more training and we needed more stuff but 
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we were always told that there was no money.  Guys asked to go to classes but there was 
no money to send them.  After the NIOSH report came out the city asked: ‘what do you 
need?’ ”   This latter comment reinforces that the LODD was more of a catalyst than a 
cause of the change. 
In addition to the changes reported by the members, during the researcher’s time with 
the department he was a witness to several changes in MOIs, including new SCBA, new 
rescue tools being put into service and the old tools being donated to a needy neighboring 
department, and improvement of the home-made exhaust removal system to a 
commercial system, to exhaust the diesel soot from the apparatus directly from the 
vehicles to the outside.  
Applying Gagliardi’s Model.   
Cultural Incrementalism can account for the changes in the department from 
2010-2015.   The two phases of change, chief- and subordinate leader-initiated, 
complement the idea of cultural incrementalism by spreading the changes out to different 
members at different times.  They also built in an empowerment to the members of the 
organizational culture which created buy-in from those members.  Unique to this case 
was the LODD of a member as these changes were occurring, making it difficult for 
members to push back against the changes to the organizational culture.   
There are also indications that change occurred at deeper levels of the model 
within this department.  The lines on the graphic for culture are finite, but in reality there 
is some fluidity between the levels.  The openness of communication between members 
at different levels the hierarchy and the alignment between desired and stated 
expectations suggest changes within the secondary strategies.  The Primary Strategy 
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appears to have been impacted, as these changes were implemented over a 5 year period 
and remained in existence at the time of the study.  This study was not focused on the 
deeper levels of the model, but further research could confirm that these changes truly 
occurred. 
Chapter 5 Summary 
While the assumption was that the LODD drove the change, the study revealed 
that the Chief had initiated changed before the LODD that were nascent but developing.  
The LODD caused resources to be available, for the department leaders to be more 
motivated and less resistant to change, and for the Chief to remain deeply passionate 
about the changes he needed to make.  There were first- and second-order changes on the 
department, the former driven by the Chief and the latter driven by the full-time staff and 
department officers. 
The two time periods selected were accurate to capture the change without 
infringing too closely on the LODD itself.  The MOI were an appropriate measure to 
suggest which changes occurred by generating sufficient data to answer the research 
questions and reach a conclusion, and also to provide a glimpse into why the change 
occurred.   
While this study drew a comparison of changes between two distinct points in 






Chapter 6: Conclusions, Implications, Future Research 
This study looked at a fire department that had an organizational cultural change 
between the years of 2010 and 2015.  Change did occur, and there is evidence to support 
that it was due to practice changes implemented by the fire chief following his promotion 
in 2010 and the subsequent empowerment of the other officers and full-time department 
members.  A Line of Duty Death occurred in 2011, and while it was initially viewed as 
the reason for the change, it is more accurate to characterize the LODD as a motivator 
and driver for change that was already part of the new Fire Chief’s vision.   
  Chapter 1 provided an overview of the study.  It shared that while the number of 
fires in the US has decreased, and the number of civilians killed by fire has decreased, 
and that the technology available to firefighters for increased safety has increased, the 
number of firefighters killed in the line of duty has held steady.  Three research questions 
were offered to establish time boundaries for the studies and define the unit of measure 
used within the time frames for comparison. 
Chapter 2 situated the problem in the HRD and Firefighting literature, showing 
that the fire service has a deeply-rooted culture, and shared that national firefighting 
organization were attributing LODDs to this organizational culture.   A review of culture, 
organizational culture, and some aspects of the fire service organizational culture were 
offered.  For purposes of this paper, fire service organizational culture was defined as the 
values, assumptions, beliefs, observable traits, expressed rationales, strategies, stories, 
heroes, and traditions of a group of fire service members at a specific bounded level.   
Chapter 3 proposed a research plan of a single, instrumental case study of one fire 
department and detailed the criteria and process for case selection.  The research plan 
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addressed looking specifically at two time periods that were compared using Pasquale 
Gagliardi’s model for the creation and change of organizational cultures.  A detailed 
description of how data would be collected and triangulated was offered. 
Chapter 4 shared the selected setting for the study.  It described the community, a 
historical view of the fire department, three mini-case studies of events that impacted the 
fire department’s organizational culture, and concluded with a description of the events 
surrounding the LODD. 
Chapter 5 provided the findings of the study.  The findings were coded using 
themes that emerged from the analysis of interview, document review, and observational 
data.  The data were compared between 2010 and 2015, with 28 data points in 6 
categories demonstrating that change had occurred.  These MOI and themes can serve as 
the basis for additional study as recommended below.   
 The preliminary hypothesis based on initial screening that the department existed 
a certain way in 2010, they experienced an LODD, changed their organizational culture 
as a result, and were a changed department in 2015.  What the study revealed was that the 
promotion of a new fire chief with a strong vision in April of 2010 started the winds of 
change at the department, and the department was primed and ready to unfreeze and 
accept some changes as the result of the leadership transition.  The LODD served to 
catalyze and reinforce the changes that the Chief had started to institute in 2010, and 
these initial changes created a set of new positions and responsibilities for members.  As 
these members grew into and fulfilled the chief’s vision for these new positions, a second 
wave of change occurred, led by the subordinate members of the department as they 




 There was a change to the department’s organizational culture between 2010 and 
2015.  Many aspects of the first wave of organizational culture change can be directly 
tied back to the leadership change that occurred in April of 2010 when a new fire chief 
was promoted.  There was strong influence from the LODD that took place in 2011 in the 
form of resources and motivation as well as reinforcing what many members of the 
department already new- the department needed to look critically at their agency and 
develop a plan to improve.  While the change was in progress when the LODD occurred, 
one member described the fugue in the months immediately following the event as 
“Things got worse before they got better” because the chief was off work for several 
months following the LODD, and the Assistant Chief filled in for him.  At the same time, 
the department struggled to make sense of the LODD and reorient them to a new reality.  
 The second wave of change was led by subordinate leaders in the fire department 
as a result of being empowered with new responsibilities by the fire chief.  These new 
responsibilities made each subordinate leader a change agent in a particular area, and 
with the support of the fire chief each area of responsibility saw growth, expanded 
functionality, and overall increased effectiveness. 
The outermost level of Gagliardi’s Model for the Creation and Change of 
Organizational Cultures, Modes of Implementation, and the concept of Cultural 
Incrementalism does account for the changes that occurred to the Du Quoin Fire 
Department.  The phased nature of the implementation of the changes in two waves, first 
by the chief, and later by the department leadership unintentionally applied cultural 
incrementalism to lead changes.   
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An example of this change is the expressive strategy that was modified from “we 
go in” to “we go in if the benefits are greater than the risks.” This quote is an example of 
the successful implementation of Gagliardi’s concept of cultural incrementalism in this 
case study.  This quote also indicates that there are likely changes deeper than the level of 
Modes of Implementation, creating an area for additional study. 
Chief Dennis Compton’s definition for the organizational culture of a fire 
department was utilized.  It includes “all the behaviors, ideas, attitudes, and values shared 
by a group” of firefighters which is transmitted to current, new, and future members of 
the group (Compton, 2010).  The comparison and analysis of the Modes of 
Implementation in this study support the observable components of this definition, and  
validate the behavior portion of this definition for use in future studies. 
Implications for HRD  
 This study adds to the HRD literature by exploring the role of the organizational 
leadership in successful change implementation, identifying a level of analysis (MOIs) 
that appear valid for measuring cultural change within an organization with a deeply-
rooted culture, and reinvigorates Gagliardi’s Model for the Creation and Change of 
Organizational Cultures as a tool for measuring cultural change. 
 This study was conducted at the level of Modes of Implementation, or observable 
behaviors, in a strong culture.  This level of analysis provided rich data for comparison, 
generating 28 specific modes that were compared.  Similar modes can be identified 
within non-fire service organizations leading to similar comparisons in other 
organizations with stronger cultures, and in those with weaker cultures. 
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 Since the model was applied in a deeply-rooted culture, the model should also 
hold true for less deeply-rooted cultures.  HRD practitioners can apply this model outside 
of emergency services in general situations where an organization needs to institute a 
change in organizational culture. 
 This study also fills a gap in the literature on cultural change in emergency 
services organizations and other organizations with deeply-rooted cultures.  Law 
enforcement agencies, emergency medical services, dispatch agencies, and military 
agencies can also benefit from this study and leverage Gagliardi’s model for cultural 
change needs in their organizations.  While additional research is necessary to validate 
the study within each industry, these groups have also been noted to have change-
resistant and robust cultures, and the model could be tested in those milieus.  
 HRD theory is also advanced, because this is only the second scientific study of 
an organization that experienced a cultural change subsequent to an on-duty death.   Of 
an even greater contribution to the theoretical knowledge base is the resulting discovery 
in this study that the change resulted from the role of leadership as well as the death, 
which allows the model to be applied to other organizational cultures for change without 
the aspect of a fatality. 
 This model is also available for HRD practitioners who are engaged in changing 
organizational culture, understanding how to lead a successful culture change, and how to 
categorize levels of culture in need of change.  It also provides a framework for planning 
and enacting strategic change in an organization. 
Implications for Fire Departments 
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 This study supports that cultural change can occur in a fire department and that 
Gagliardi’s concept of cultural incrementalism can be used to assess current MOIs and 
set goals for future MOIs.  MOIs can then be implemented gradually as part of a strategic 
plan to change or modify certain aspects of the organizational culture.  It also offers a 
partial validation of a definition of some components of fire department organizational 
culture, opening the door for future explorations that seek to better identify the 
components that are present in fire departments that contribute to the organizational 
culture. 
 The DQFD implemented the various MOI changes at different times.  While there 
was a plan in place from the Fire Chief, when he took a leave of absence following the 
LODD, there was a period of discontinuity of progression for the changes.  Some MOI 
changes drove others, and that order should be considered in agencies that are seeking to 
make changes in one of the same or similar areas.   
 The most important change was in the area of Officer Empowerment.  By 
establishing these MOIs first a vision is established, along with a foundation for the next 
two areas, Member Requirements/Onboarding and Training.  New members were 
onboarded within the new vision of more distributed leadership and under established 
member requirements for promotion and advancement.  The MOI changes seen in the 
Typical Day, Emergency Responses, and External Relationship flow through from the 
broader strategies implemented by the newly-empowered officers through an enhanced 
and coordinated training program.   
 This study reinforces David Griffin’s statement that “strategic leadership is 
important following [Fire Department LODDs]” (Griffin, 2013, p. 213).  Griffin analyzed 
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the changes within the Charleston, South Carolina Fire Department following multiple 
LODDs in 2009. This study validates the use of Gagliardi’s model for the study, 
planning, and execution of changes at the MOI level within a fire service organization. 
This study also supports Edgar Schein’s comment that “The only thing of real 
importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture” (Schein, 2014).  In this case, 
there were two waves of leadership, first from the fire chief’s direct actions, and the 
second wave from empowered staff members.  The LODD occurred between these two 
waves of implementation, and changes were in progress on the culture when the LODD 
occurred.  This provides evidence that change can be planned and executed in a deeply-
rooted culture outside of the LODD milieu. 
Implications for the Fire Service as a Whole 
 In addition to the single organization- and department-level applications listed 
above, this study can be utilized to build training programs that can be shared with 
agencies in emergency services.  Fire departments and other agencies can be trained to 
identify the need for cultural change, identify the current state of the organization, plan 
the change, and then implement and measure the change as it progresses.  This could be 
broadened to include any agency with a deeply-rooted culture that has a need for 
organizational culture change.  
 These trainings could be included in programs at a macro level at national 
conferences and the National Fire Academy, delivered through State Fire Training 
Academies, and locally at larger metropolitan departments and departments throughout 
the fire service.  How to identify cultural components and enact change at the unit or 
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department level can also be incorporated into national standards, and made a part of the 
training for officers and leaders across the fire service. 
Applicability of this Study to other Agencies 
 Four indicators of quality for data collected for qualitative research were applied 
in this study, based upon the work of Lincoln and Guba (1985).  The four measures are 
Credibility, Transferability, Dependability, and Confirmability.  Adherence to these 
measures created a study that has greater potential to be utilized or compared to other 
situations. 
 Credibility was validated by having members who participated in the study 
review results and conclusions.  Following this internal check, persons familiar with the 
case but outside the department reviewed the findings and validated that the findings to 
provide outside credibility. 
 Transferability ensures external validity.  As discussed in the Chapter 3, there are 
inherent limitations to a qualitative study like this case study.  The case was described in 
detail so that another fire department could be matched against this one for potential 
comparisons.  However, drawing comparisons to other fire departments must be done 
cautiously and only where there are allegories between the two agencies. 
 Dependability ensures that the questions, methods, and data are matched for the 
case.  The greatest assurance of this was provided through the Dissertation Committee 
who reviewed all aspects of the project before it began, and who served as a resource 
during the data collection and analysis.  This study was also compared to a similar study 
by Dr. David Griffin, which allowed some structural comparisons between aspects of the 
study where they were similar to his study. 
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 Finally, confirmability or objectivity was ensured by keeping detailed records of 
the study as it progressed, including original transcripts, interim records as the analysis 
and coding began, and triangulation of methods and data by the dissertation committee.  
As previously mentioned, the study focused on observation-based Modes of 
Implementation. 
Limitations 
 This study focused on the two time periods but did not specifically ask about the 
events immediately surrounding the June 2011 LODD.  There might be a greater impact 
on the study from the LODD than is revealed and discussed in this study because the 
topic was avoided because of the sensitive nature unless individuals initiated the 
discussion during their interviews.  While the LODD was originally viewed as the reason 
for the change, the fire chief’s leadership played a larger role.  The tragedy reinforced the 
changes that the fire chief laid out in his vision and helped to garner allies and change 
agents in the DQFD and across the region. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 Future research opportunities include: 
 Follow up with this agency at a future time and reassess how much of the change 
has been made permanent, and which new MOIs could be identified.  As one 
member stated, “We’re not done changing.” 
 Repeat the study in a department that wishes to see a change in their 
organizational culture, and conduct a prospective study.   
 Repeat the MOI comparison study in a department that underwent a 
reorganization or other major change, but without an LODD. 
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 Repeat the study in a department that experienced an LODD, but without a top-
down change occurring at the same time. 
 Apply Gagliardi’s Model for the Creation and Change of Organizational Cultures 
to a department seeking a change to a safety culture. 
 Repeat the study with a focus on a deeper level of Gagliardi’s model, for example, 
one of the Secondary Strategies.   
 Explore the impact of the Smoke Diver’s program on other classes in the area. 
Concluding Thoughts 
 Using the Modes of Implementation from Pasquale Gagliardi’s Model for the 
Creation and Change of Organizational Culture generated sufficient data from the two 
time periods to determine that a change to the DQFD’s organizational culture did indeed 
occur.  The case study method allowed the researcher to understand that the observed and 
stated changes occurred following the LODD, but many had their origins to changes 
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Appendix B: Oral Survey Statement 
“Thank you for the opportunity to interview you for my dissertation.  I am a doctoral 
student at the University Of Illinois College Of Education, and this research is being 
overseen by my advisor, Dr. Peter Kuchinke. 
 
The case study I am conducting will ask you questions about your experiences in the 
department in 2010 and 2015.  I am interested in learning about how your department is 
different between the two time periods.   
 
This study is approved by the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board.  
 
(Review IRB information on the consent form with the interviewee). 
 
Interviews will be kept confidential.  You will be identified as “FF” or Officer and a 
random number.    
 
After you read and sign the consent form, I will answer any questions before beginning 
the interview.  
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Appendix D: Interview Guide 
1. How long have you been a firefighter? 
 
2. How long with this department? 
 
3. What is your current position? 
 
4. What is your pedigree that brought you to this rank? 
 
5. Do you have family members that are in the fire service?  How did they influence 
you? 
 
6. What drew you to the fire service? 
 
7. What is it like to be a member here? 
 
8. What are three exceptional aspects of the DQFD? 
 
9. What is something that you would change if you were Chief? 
 
10. Please describe what the department was like prior to 2010.  What was training 
like?  Going on responses?  Around the station? 
 
11. What is the department like now?  Training, responses, around the station? 
 
12. How has the way you respond to a fire changed? 
 




Appendix E: Document Review Guide 
Title of Document: 
(Form is condensed for Appendix) 
 
Date of review: 
Scope/Intent of document: 
 




Location of document:  Public, Private, 
Posted, Archived 
 
Content of Document: 
Member awareness of document: Member knowledge/familiarity of 
document: 
 
Document connected to: 
 Modes of Implementation 
 Instrumental Strategy 
 Expressive Strategy 
 Primary Strategy 
 Assumptions 
 Basic Values 
 
 






Appendix F: Observation Guide 
Date: Location: 
Persons Present: 
(Form is condensed for Appendix) 
 
 
Description of location: 
Milieu:  (Décor, colors, artifacts, posted 
documents, what is on the walls, floors, 
ceiling; furniture, lighting): 
 
Interactions between persons & location: 
Modes of Implementation: Observable 
Behaviors of members.  Static Artifacts.  
Physical aspects of the environment. 
 
Instrumental Strategies: Rationale behind 
outward-focused (public) behaviors and 
artifacts. 
Expressive Strategies: Rationale behind 
inward-focused (non-public) behaviors 
and artifacts. 
Assumptions & Basic Values: Member 
thoughts and beliefs about organizational 










Appendix G: Coding Schema 
Typical Day at the Department  
- General Comments 
Member Requirements & onboarding 
- Career O Qualifications 
- Career FF Qualifications 
- POC O Qualifications  
- POC FF  Qualifications 
- POC Participation  
- Initial Training (Career & Volunteer) 
Responses 
- Accountability System  
- Fire Responses 
- Volunteer Responses 
- Medical Responses 
External  
- Compartment Standardization 
- Interagency Partnerships 
- Interagency Training 
- Automatic Aid 






- Fire Prevention/ Public Education 
- Equipment 
- NFIRS Reporting 
- Apparatus 
Training 
- Driver Training/Familiarization 
- Company/Shift Training 
- Departmental Training 
- Interagency Training 
 
